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FREE SPEECH TO HAVE SWEATSHOPS? 
HOW KASKY V. NIKE MIGHT PROVIDE A 
USEFUL TOOL TO IMPROVE SWEATSHOP 
CONDITIONS 
Julia Fisher*
Abstract: In 1998, consumer activist Marc Kasky sued Nike, claiming that 
Nike’s statements in the media denying sweatshop conditions in its facto-
ries were false advertising. This case, culminating in a controversial Cali-
fornia Supreme Court decision, has attracted much criticism on its impli-
cations of free speech. Little attention has been paid to how Nike v. Kasky 
might be a useful tool for anti-sweatshop advocates, who have up until 
now had great difªculty holding companies accountable for their sweat-
shop labor conditions. This Note examines the anti-sweatshop movement 
and its lack of effective private enforcement techniques. It then explores 
how the California Supreme Court in Kasky expanded the commercial 
speech doctrine. Lastly, it analyzes how Kasky might be used by anti-
sweatshop advocates against corporations with sweatshop conditions. This 
Note concludes that Kasky is an imperfect tool but one that, when used in 
moderation, would not have a strong chilling effect on corporate speech. 
Introduction 
 On Saturday, November 8, 1997, Marc Kasky picked up a copy of 
the New York Times and was struck by the front page headline, “Nike 
Shoe Plant in Vietnam is Called Unsafe for Workers.”1 The story de-
tailed how a disgruntled Nike employee had leaked a damning internal 
audit of a Nike factory in Vietnam, uncovering numerous illegal and 
dangerous working conditions.2 Massive amounts of carcinogens were 
discovered in the air of the factory, and employees were found to rou-
tinely work ten and a half hour days, six days a week, in violation of 
                                                                                                                      
* Senior Articles Editor, Boston College Third World Law Journal (2005–2006). 
1 Steven Greenhouse, Nike Shoe Plant in Vietnam Is Called Unsafe for Workers, N.Y. Times, 
Nov. 8, 1997, at A1; Roger Parloff, Can We Talk?, Fortune, Sept. 2, 2002, at 102, 108. 
2 Greenhouse, supra note 1, at A1, D2. The New York Times received the report in very 
circuitous fashion. Id. at D2. A Nike employee gave the internal audit to Dara O’Rourke, 
an employee of the United Nations Industrial Development Organization, who inspects 
factories in Vietnam. Id. O’Rourke gave the audit to The Transnational Resources and 
Action Center, who then made the report available to the New York Times. Id. 
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Vietnamese law.3 Seventy-seven percent of the workers suffered from 
respiratory diseases, likely caused by the poor air quality in the factory.4 
The article contrasted the audit’s ªndings with statements from Nike 
spokesperson Vada Manager, who commented that “there is a growing 
body of documentation that indicates that Nike workers earn superior 
wages and manufacture product under superior conditions.”5
 The article sparked a strong reaction within Mr. Kasky, a San 
Francisco consumer activist who had stopped buying Nike shoes sev-
eral years earlier because of their sweatshop practices.6 Mr. Kasky had 
recently been heartened when Nike released a code of conduct, 
which mandated certain health, safety, worker’s rights and environ-
mental standards by which all foreign Nike factories must abide.7 The 
New York Times article revealed to Mr. Kasky that these codes were 
seemingly a sham.8 It also made him feel uneasy because, as he ex-
plained later, “[it] struck me as false advertising. . . . The Nike code of 
conduct is marketing their products. They’re marketing it to me un-
der false grounds.”9 Kasky then contacted an old friend, lawyer Alan 
Caplan, to discuss bringing a claim against Nike under California’s 
false advertising and unfair competition laws.10
 This was the genesis of Kasky v. Nike, a false advertising case that 
sparked a controversial 2002 California Supreme Court decision con-
                                                                                                                      
3 Id. at A1, D2. In the Tae Kwange Vina Factory, which makes 400,000 shoes a month 
and employs 9,200 workers, the audit found that 
[c]arcinogens that exceeded local legal standards by 177 times in parts of the 
plant and that 77 percent of the employees suffered from respiratory prob-
lems. The report also said that employees at the site . . . were forced to work 




6 Parloff, supra note 1, at 108. While by profession Kasky assisted cities by transforming 
unused military bases into community cultural centers, he had ªled two similar false adver-
tising lawsuits in the past. Id. One was against Perrier for claiming its water was spring wa-
ter, another was against Pillsbury Co.’s labeling certain products as “San Francisco style” 





10 Id. At the time Kasky ªled the suit, both laws allowed claims to be ªled by either a 
public prosecutor or a private attorney general who is deªned as “any person acting for 
the interests of the general public.” Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 249 (Cal. 2002). 
Therefore, private citizens could ªle such suits even though they may not have been per-
sonally injured. Id. 
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cerning the blurry line between free speech and commercial 
speech.11 Kasky alleged that many of Nike’s factual assertions con-
cerning its labor practices abroad were false and misleading—
assertions Nike made in a letter to the editor of the New York Times, a 
press release, a posting on Nike’s website, and a letter to university 
presidents and athletic directors.12 That the false advertising suit ad-
dressed statements made during a public relations campaign, and not 
in the traditional context of an advertisement, destined Kasky for con-
troversy. Nike reframed the case as a First Amendment issue, claiming 
its assertions were not commercial speech and therefore could not be 
be challenged under the false advertising law.13 To the chagrin of 
many free speech advocates and corporations, the California Supreme 
Court disagreed, holding that Nike’s statements lose full First 
Amendment protection when they “concern facts material to com-
mercial transactions—here, factual statements about how Nike makes 
its products.”14 In a surprising move, the U.S. Supreme Court initially 
agreed to hear Kasky on appeal, but after oral arguments issued a de-
cision that the writ of certiorari was “improvidently granted,” and de-
clined to discuss the merits of the case.15
 In the aftermath of the Supreme Court’s nonruling, little discus-
sion has followed regarding how the California Supreme Court’s deci-
sion in Kasky might provide anti-sweatshop activists with an innovative 
way to hold corporations accountable for their labor conditions in fac-
                                                                                                                      
11 See Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654, 654 (2003); Kasky, 45 P.3d at 262; Rosemary 
Feitelberg & Joanna Ramey, Nike Supreme Court Case Tests Free Speech, Footwear News, Feb. 
10, 2003, at 12, available at http://lexis.com. Confusingly, the order of the names of the 
parties switched from Kasky v. Nike to Nike v. Kasky on appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court. 
See Nike, 539 U.S. at 654; Kasky, 45 P.3d at 243. For clarity’s sake, this Note will consistently 
refer to the case as Kasky in the main text, since it was the California Supreme Court’s 
decision that potentially created this new tool for activists, but citations will follow Bluebook 
protocol. 
12 Nike, 539 U.S. at 672; Kasky, 45 P.3d at 248. Speciªcally, Kasky claimed Nike made six 
misrepresentations as to its labor practices: 1) that workers who make Nike shoes are never 
subject to corporal punishment or sexual abuse, 2) that Nike workers were treated in ac-
cordance with applicable local government laws relating to wages and hours, 3) that Nike 
workers were also treated in accordance with applicable local laws relating to health and 
safety, 4) that Nike pays double the minimum wage in Southeast Asia, 5) workers who pro-
duce Nike products receive free meals and health care, and 6) that Nike guarantees a liv-
ing wage for all workers who make Nike products. Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 854, 
857 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000). 
13 Kasky, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 857. 
14 Kasky, 45 P.3d at 261. 
15 Nike, 539 U.S. at 655, 657. 
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tories overseas.16 Kasky exploited the uncertainty of the commercial 
speech doctrine to create a novel cause of action: suing corporations 
based on their false statements concerning labor conditions, not based 
on the actual conditions themselves.17 Although such lawsuits address 
only speech, they may still be very attractive to labor activists, who his-
torically have had little success in seeking legal recourse against U.S.-
based corporations for their labor practices abroad.18 A proliferation of 
Kasky-style lawsuits, however, risks chilling corporate speech so that 
companies may decline to discuss labor conditions in their factories.19 
Indeed, this chilling may already be occurring, as many corporations 
and advertising groups declared after Kasky that they would refrain 
from publicly discussing any important public issues.20
 This Note will examine the utility of Kasky-style lawsuits to chal-
lenge or change corporate labor practices both abroad and at home. 
Part I discusses the anti-sweatshop movement of the 1990s that func-
tions as the context for Kasky. Part II examines the inadequacy of exist-
ing techniques anti-sweatshop activists use to try to hold corporations 
accountable for unfair labor conditions abroad and domestically. Part 
III explores the commercial speech doctrine, focusing on the Califor-
nia Supreme Court’s holding in Kasky with regard to the doctrine, and 
                                                                                                                      
16 See, e.g., Thomas C. Goldstein, Nike v. Kasky and the Deªnition of Commercial Speech, in 
2003 Cato Sup. Ct. Rev. 63, 63 (2003). Generally, discussion has centered on critiquing 
the California Supreme Court’s commercial speech analysis and the United States Su-
preme Court’s strange disposal of the case. See id. Corporations and advertising groups 
have also bemoaned that the case will cause corporations to withdraw from public debate 
for fear of lawsuits from activist groups. See David M. Bigge, Bring on the Bluewash: A Social 
Constructivist Argument Against Using Nike v. Kasky to Attack the UN Global Compact, 14 Int’l 
Legal Persp. 6, 17 (2004); Theresa Howard, Advertisers Say Ruling Leaves Them in Limbo, 
USA Today, July 27, 2003, at 9B. 
17 Howard, supra note 16, at 9B. 
18 See Lena Ayoub, Nike Just Does It—And Why the United States Shouldn’t, 11 DePaul Bus. 
L.J. 395, 422 (1999); Lisa G. Balthazar, Government Sanctions and Private Initiatives: Striking a 
New Balance for U.S. Enforcement of Internationally Recognized Workers’ Rights, 29 Colum. Hum. 
Rts. L. Rev. 687, 714 (1998). Kasky settled three months after the Supreme Court’s deci-
sion, with Nike agreeing to pay $1.5 million to the Fair Labor Association, an organization 
that was created by companies, international rights groups, and universities to monitor 
labor conditions in companies’ factories abroad. Russell Mokhiber, Nike’s Come-From-Behind 
Win, Multinational Monitor, Oct. 1, 2003, at 7, available at http://lexis.com. Although 
this action disappointed labor activists, the consequence was that the California Supreme 
Court’s controversial decision became good law. Id. 
19 See Nike, 539 U.S. at 682 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Kasky, 45 P.3d at 271 (Brown, J., dis-
senting). 
20 Howard, supra note 16, at 9B. Indeed, Nike in the wake of the lawsuit declared it 
would not release its corporate responsibility report for the year of 2002 and would limit its 
participation in public events and media engagements in California. Mokhiber, supra note 
18. 
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the implications of the U.S. Supreme Court’s subsequent decision not 
to discuss the merits of the case. Part IV examines how the holding in 
Kasky could be used by labor activists, and compares the utility of Kasky-
style lawsuits to other current methods. This section also addresses the 
potential chilling effect of such lawsuits on corporations’ speech about 
labor conditions abroad and at home. Finally, this Note concludes that 
although Kasky is an imperfect instrument, anti-sweatshop activists 
could use Kasky-style lawsuits in moderation to effect change in corpo-
rate behavior without unduly chilling corporations’ speech. 
I. The Foundation: The Anti-Sweatshop Movement 
 Kasky can be understood best within the context of the massive anti-
sweatshop movement that has snowballed in the U.S. over the last dec-
ade.21 Composed of a loose coalition of college students, labor unions, 
human rights groups, churches and others, the movement began as a 
reaction to reports of terrible labor conditions in the factories of 
American corporations both abroad and at home.22 These diverse 
groups have the common goal of trying to improve labor conditions 
and have used a variety of techniques ranging from consumer boycotts 
to lawsuits with limited success thus far.23 Any discussion of the anti-
sweatshop movement, however, must be grounded in a examination of 
the economic conditions that have sparked the reemergence of sweat-
shops both within the United States and abroad. 
 Although outsourcing has recently become a hot political topic, ap-
parel and textile companies have been outsourcing their production 
facilities since the early 1970s.24 From 1961 to 1996, the percentage of 
foreign-made clothes sold in the United States rose from 6% to over 
60%.25 The domestic garment industry has shifted its production from 
America to developing nations for three reasons: low priced imports 
from abroad, cheap labor, and favorable trade rules.26 In the 1960s, low 
priced apparel imports from abroad ºooded the United States, causing 
                                                                                                                      
21 See Richard Appelbaum & Peter Dreier, The Campus Anti-Sweatshop Movement, Am.-
Prospect, Sept.–Oct. 1999, at 71, 78; David Moberg, Bringing Down Niketown, Nation, July 
7, 1999, at 15, 15–19. 
22 Moberg, supra note 21, at 15. 
23 See id. at 15–19. 
24 See Andrew Ross, Introduction, in No Sweat: Fashion, Free Trade, and the Rights 
of Garment Workers 9, 22 (Andrew Ross ed., 1997) [hereinafter No Sweat]. 
25 Alan Howard, Labor, History, and Sweatshops in the New Global Economy, in No Sweat, 
supra note 24, at 151, 156–57. 
26 Ross, supra note 24, at 22. 
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a crisis in the domestic garment industry.27 In order to remain com-
petitive, manufacturers had three options: “automate, relocate, or 
evaporate.”28 As a result, many industries chose to relocate abroad be-
cause labor was considerably cheaper in developing nations, and cor-
porations could operate there with a minimum of government regula-
tion and scrutiny.29 Moreover, domestic trade regulations encouraged 
the garment industry to do so.30 Since 1963, a special provision in the 
U.S. Tariff Schedule allows pre-cut fabric to be exported for assembly as 
a garment and then reimported to the United States, with duties being 
charged only for the value added to the garment overseas.31 Further, 
during the 1980s, President Reagan’s free trade policies reduced or 
eliminated tariffs for goods coming from the Caribbean and Central 
America, providing another incentive for garment manufacturers to 
move abroad.32
 An unintended consequence of the apparel industry relocating most 
of its production facilities abroad has been the revival of the sweatshop, 
both abroad and in the United States.33 A “sweatshop” is generally 
deªned as a business with grossly substandard working conditions, 
                                                                                                                      
27 Id. 
28 Id. The nature of the apparel industry precludes complete mechanization, which 
encourages outsourcing overseas. Id. Cloth is a ºexible and pliant material, which makes 
its use in mechanical assembly lines difªcult. Michael Piore, The Economics of the Sweatshop, 
in No Sweat, supra note 24, at 135, 138. Also, styles in the apparel industry often change 
rapidly by the season. Id. This constant change makes the investment in machinery hard to 
justify because this ºexibility can be more easily achieved by a seamstress, a sewing ma-
chine, and patterns. Id. Since the seamstress can be paid less abroad, companies have an 
incentive to outsource manufacturing overseas. See infra note 29 and accompanying text. 
29 Ross, supra note 24, at 24; Appelbaum & Dreier, supra note 21, at 72–74. Whereas in 
the United States a manufacturer must pay $5.25 per hour to each employee, in Honduras, 
wages are typically 31¢ an hour, and in Haiti, 12¢. Ross, supra note 24, at 24. Even though 
most countries have minimum wage laws, prohibitions against child labor, and safety regu-
lations, many nations are so eager for foreign investment that they do little to enforce such 
laws. Id. 
30 Ross, supra note 24, at 22. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. at 22–23. Many of these policies were the result of Reagan-era initiatives to ªght 
communism in the nation’s backyard. Id. at 22. During the 1970s, many socialist govern-
ments were taking hold across the Caribbean and Central America. Id. at 23. President 
Reagan pushed for greater free trade within the region, in the hope that this would lessen 
the allure of socialism by raising the standard of living. Id. In this spirit, Congress passed 
the Border Industrialization Initiative, which established free trade zones in several Central 
American countries, and the Caribbean Basin Initiative, which gave tariff free status to 
many products coming from the Caribbean. Id. at 22. Both policies were meant to encour-
age United States industries to invest abroad. Charles Kernaghan, Paying to Lose Our Jobs, in 
No Sweat, supra note 24, at 79, 81. 
33 Piore, supra note 28, at 135; Ross, supra note 24, at 12, 22. 
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where management regularly violates one or more laws governing child 
labor, wages and hours, or health and safety.34 Those apparel manufac-
turers who relocated abroad found substandard working conditions 
were tolerated and, in some ways, encouraged by host governments.35 
Reports of working conditions that were grossly substandard—such as 
forced birth control on female workers, the suspicious deaths of union 
workers, routine twenty hour work days—began to trickle out of many 
garment factories in developing nations in the 1990s.36 At the same 
time, those manufacturers who remained in the U.S. were forced to cut 
costs to remain competitive with the lower-priced imports.37 Many did 
so by adopting illegal practices such as paying below the minimum 
wage, and ignoring overtime provisions and health regulations.38
 In the early 1990s, unions, human rights groups, and consumer 
groups began to respond to the reports of terrible treatment in many 
garment factories.39 These groups attempted to get the attention of the 
                                                                                                                      
34 Gen. Accounting Ofªce, Data on the Tax Compliance of Sweatshops 1 
(1994), available at http://www.unclefed.com/GAOReports/ggd94-210fs.pdf; Ross, supra 
note 24, at 10–14. No federal law or regulation deªnes sweatshop. Gen. Accounting 
Ofªce, supra at 1. Historically, the term sweatshop derives from the system of subcontract-
ing apparel work that ºourished in the United States at the turn of the 20th century. Pi-
ore, supra note 28, at 135; Ross, supra note 24, at 13. In this system, instead of having gar-
ments fully assembled in one factory, the garment would be sent to several different 
contractors who had shops to do one speciªc task on the garment, such as sewing linings 
into coats. See David Von Drehle, Triangle: The Fire That Changed America 40 
(2003); Ross supra note 24, at 13. The term sweatshop arises from the idea that these con-
tractors literally “sweated” the proªts out of the workers by forcing them to work long 
hours for little pay. Von Drehle, supra at 36. In the 1990s, the General Accounting Ofªce 
created a working deªnition of sweatshop as “a business that violates more than one fed-
eral or state law governing wages and hours, child labor, health or safety, workers compen-
sation, or industry registration.” Gen. Accounting Ofªce, supra at 1. 
35 Howard, supra note 25, at 157 (for an explanation of why host countries are reluc-
tant to enforce or improve working conditions, see infra notes 109–12 and accompanying 
text). 
36 Ross, supra note 24, at 25–27. 
37 See Piore, supra note 28, at 135. 
38 Id. at 12. It is estimated that one third of New York City’s shops are sweatshops, as 
are ninety percent of the shops in Los Angeles. Id. Many citizens were justiªably shocked 
by such reports, particularly because the United States had fought and been fairly success-
ful in eradicating sweatshop conditions domestically during the ªrst third of the twentieth 
century. Piore, supra note 28, at 135. The Progressive Movement ªrst began trying to im-
prove the conditions of sweatshops during the early twentieth century, but sweatshops 
were not truly obliterated until the New Deal and passage of the Fair Labor Standards Act 
of 1938. Id. at 135, 139. 
39 Kernaghan, supra note 32, at 44. In Europe, an anti-sweatshop movement began in 
the 1980s when a European department store chain retaliated against sweatshop workers 
organizing for better treatment in the Philippines. Maria Gillen, The Apparel Industry Part-
nership’s Free Labor Association: A Solution to the Overseas Sweatshop Problem or the Emperor’s New 
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mainstream media and force changes in corporate behavior, with few 
victories.40 One rare success was a campaign of the National Labor 
Committee (NLC) in 1992.41 The NLC became aware of abuses taking 
place in Central American factories, which were owned by American 
companies and supported by tax incentives through the Agency for In-
ternational Development (USAID).42 In an election year that focused 
on the economy, the NLC successfully framed the problem as one of 
U.S. tax dollars supporting the outsourcing of jobs to Central Amer-
ica.43 “60 Minutes” aired a segment on the situation in Central Ameri-
can factories, prompting presidential candidate Bill Clinton to speak 
on the topic, and Congress to pass a law forbidding such incentives.44
 In the mid-1990s, however, two events focused the public and me-
dia attention on the many human rights violations occurring in sweat-
shops abroad and at home.45 In August 1995, federal and state agents 
raided a garment factory in El Monte, a suburb of Los Angeles, and 
found seventy-one Thai immigrants being held in involuntary servi-
tude.46 These workers, many of whom had been held in captivity for 
years behind barbed wire fences, were forced to work up to eighty-
four hours a week making clothes bound for Filenes, Macy’s and 
Nordstrom’s.47 This incident sparked outrage throughout the nation, 
                                                                                                                      
Clothes?, 32 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 1059, 1067 (2000). A boycott against the department 
store chain was organized, and after its partially successful conclusion, an organization 
called the Clean Clothes Campaign arose. Id. This group has chapters in almost a dozen 
European countries and focuses on empowering garment workers abroad. Id. 
40 See Kernaghan, supra note 32, at 44; All Things Considered: Toycott (NPR radio broad-
cast Dec. 17, 1996). For example, in 1991, the AFL-CIO, together with the National Con-
sumer’s League and Tibetan rights groups, initiated a “toycott” of toys made in China to 
protest the use of child labor and forced prison labor to produce these toys. Tom Brown, 
Groups Announce Chinese ‘Toycott’—Slave Labor, Child Labor Alleged in Manufacture, Seattle 
Times, Nov. 25, 1991, at B4, available at http://lexis.com. The toycott transpired on and off 
for about ªve years without any real results. All Things Considered, supra (discussing that 
after ªve years the toycott had been largely unsuccessful). 
41 Kitty Krupat, From War Zone to Free Trade Zone, in No Sweat, supra note 24, at 51, 72–
73. The NLC was originally formed to protest the AFL-CIO’s support of U.S. policies in El 
Salvador and Nicaragua and had formed many contacts with labor leaders in Central 
America. Id at 64–68. During these campaigns, the NLC became aware that many United 
States companies were relocating their manufacturing facilities to Central America, with 
terrible work conditions. Id. at 65–66. USAID set up many incentives to encourage such 
relocation, including cheap loans, and tax rebates. Id. at 72–73. 
42 Krupat, supra note 41, at 72–73. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. at 73. 
45 Appelbaum & Dreier, supra note 21, at 74. 
46 Id. 
47 Ross, supra note 24, at 29; Appelbaum & Dreier, supra note 21, at 74. 
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and was only overshadowed by the revelation that child labor in Hon-
duras produced Kathie Lee’s clothing line at Wal-Mart.48 On April 29, 
1996, a ªfteen-year-old worker from a factory that manufactured the 
Kathie Lee line testiªed at a congressional hearing as to the terrible 
working conditions.49 Kathie Lee herself initially denied both knowl-
edge and responsibility as to how her clothing line was produced, but 
in the face of an intense media storm, she quickly changed course.50 
She not only apologized to the worker, but also urged Wal-Mart to es-
tablish an independent monitoring system of its factories abroad, and 
she has since become an anti-sweatshop advocate.51
 These stories popularized the anti-sweatshop movement, drawing 
diverse groups together to mobilize campaigns on the issue.52 The In-
terfaith Center for Corporate Responsibility and Domini Social Invest-
ments began offering stockholder resolutions demanding a halt to la-
bor rights abuses.53 Unions, such as Union of Needle Trades, Industrial 
and Textile Workers (UNITE) and the International Textile, Garment 
and Leather Workers’ Foundation began major campaigns to organize 
sweatshop workers domestically and abroad.54 Consumer groups such 
as the NLC and Human Rights Watch continued highly publicized 
campaigns against the GAP, Philips–Van Heusen, Disney and Star-
                                                                                                                      
48 Ross, supra note 24, at 27. These revelations about Kathie Lee’s clothing line were 
orchestrated by the National Labor Committee. Krupat, supra note 41, at 59–61. 
49 Krupat, supra note 41, at 59–60. Fifteen year old Wendy Dias testiªed that 
[a]t Global Fashion, there are about 100 minors like me—thirteen, fourteen 
years old—some even twelve. On the Kathie Lee pants, we were forced to 
work almost every day from 8 am to 9 pm. . . . Working all these hours, I made 
at most 240 lempiras, which is 31 U.S. cents. . . . The supervisors insult us and 
yell at us to work faster. . . . The bathroom is locked and you need permission 
and can use it twice a day. 
Id. at 60. 
50 Id. at 61. 
51 Id. at 61–62. 
52 Moberg, supra note 21, at 15. 
53 Id.; Domini Social Investments: Spotlight on Sweatshops (1997–2005), http://www.do- 
mini.com/shareholder-advocacy/Issue-Spotlight/index.htm (last visited Jan. 13, 2006). 
54 Moberg, supra note 21, at 16. Organizing both abroad and at home, however, has 
been difªcult due to the nature of the garment industry, where shops can be shut down or 
opened with ease. Appelbaum & Dreier, supra note 21, at 71. When UNITE tried to organ-
ize sweatshops that produced garments for Guess, in Los Angeles, Guess removed its busi-
ness from those shops and began contracting with shops in Mexico. Moberg, supra note 21, 
at 16. Guess’ move was entirely legal, as the National Labor Relations Act only protects 
unionized employees against the actions of employers. See National Labor Relations Act of 
1935, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (2005). Here, Guess did not employ the workers, but was instead a 
customer of the independent garment shops that did employ them. 
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bucks.55 Unexpectedly, college student groups also came to play a ma-
jor rule in the anti-sweatshop movement.56
 The anti-sweatshop movement beneªted greatly from the support 
and participation of college students.57 Student activist groups such as 
the United Students Against Sweatshops targeted a very narrow slice 
of the garment industry: the collegiate licensing industry.58 This in-
dustry, which includes large corporations such as Nike, Champion 
and Fruit of the Loom, is responsible for manufacturing the sweat-
shirts, caps, tee-shirts and other clothing articles that bear the logo of 
various universities.59 Anti-sweatshop student activists demanded that 
their university’s clothing be manufactured in safe working conditions 
for fair wages and during reasonable hours.60 The ªrst success came 
in 1997 at Duke University, where student activists convinced the ad-
ministration to require all licensing companies to adhere to a code of 
conduct forbidding child labor, requiring the minimum wage, and 
allowing visits by independent monitors.61 This victory sparked stu-
dent activists on 100 campuses across the country to begin their own 
campaigns, with varying degrees of success.62
 Despite the anti-sweatshop movement’s large coalition, the move-
ment’s achievements have been limited mostly to attracting media at-
tention and gaining support from the public, as opposed to instituting 
meaningful reform.63 This is due to the limitations of the consumer 
boycott—the technique of choice for most of the anti-sweatshop move-
ment.64 Boycotts succeed in bringing attention and embarrassment to 
the targeted company, and usually wring out concessions from the 
                                                                                                                      
55 Moberg, supra note 21, at 15. 
56 Appelbaum & Dreier, supra note 21, at 71–78. 
57 Id. The anti-sweatshop student movement is arguably the most pervasive example of 
student activism since the South African divestment campaign of the 1980s. Id. at 71. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. at 75–76. 
60 Id. 
61 Appelbaum & Dreier, supra note 21, at 71. 
62 Id. Student activists have used a variety of techniques to convince the administra-
tions of the campuses to ªght against sweatshops. Id. at 75–76. These range from 1960s-
style occupations of administrative buildings, to less disruptive publicity stunts such as fash-
ion shows discussing the conditions in which college clothes were made to presenting the 
college chancellor with a giant check for 16 cents—the hourly wage of factory workers in 
China. Id. at 75. 
63 Moberg, supra note 21, at 15–19. 
64 Id. at 16. 
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company such as promises to improve labor practices.65 After the me-
dia storm has moved on, companies often put little effort into chang-
ing labor practices, or revert back to old ways, leaving activists to ªght 
the same ªghts over again.66 The lack of long-term enforcement 
mechanisms, either through governmental framework or the court sys-
tems, allows corporations to avoid genuine reform.67 As the next sec-
tion shows, anti-sweatshop activists have had limited success working 
within existing governmental framework, using the courts to enforce 
agreements, or holding companies ªnancially accountable for unjust 
labor conditions.68
II. Legal and Governmental Barriers to Improving  
Sweatshop Conditions 
 Although the anti-sweatshop movement has attempted to improve 
sweatshop conditions using many different strategies, thus far most 
have provided limited achievements.69 Domestically, federal and state 
laws that address the problems of sweatshops are not enforced effec-
tively, and anti-sweatshop advocates have had limited success using the 
courts to curb sweatshop abuses for a variety of reasons.70 Techniques 
to ªght foreign sweatshops are even more limited, due to the com-
                                                                                                                      
65 Id.; The Shame of Sweatshops, Consumer Rep., Aug. 1999, at 18, 19. Usually those con-
cessions take the form of adopting codes of conduct for their factories. Moberg, supra note 
21, at 16–18. 
66 Moberg, supra note 21, at 16; The Shame of Sweatshops, supra note 65, at 19. For ex-
ample, Liz Claiborne adopted a code of conduct in the face of pressure in 1994. Id. In 
1998, however, workers in several factories in El Salvador continued to work eighty-ªve 
hours a week, seven days a week. Id. These workers told the NLC that when monitors came 
to look at the factories, the factories were cleaned and painted. Id. 
67 See Moberg, supra note 21, at 18. 
68 Id. at 15–19. 
69 Id. 
70 Edna Bonacich & Richard P. Appelbaum, Behind the Label: Inequality in the 
Los Angeles Apparel Industry 221–61 (2000). While Kasky is aimed at corporations’ 
labor abuses abroad, a discussion of barriers to curbing domestic sweatshop abuses is im-
portant for two reasons. Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 247–48 (Cal. 2002). First, the 
problems of domestic and foreign sweatshops are interrelated. See supra notes 39, 55 and 
accompanying text. It was the apparel industries’ move overseas that created the resur-
gence of sweatshops domestically. See supra notes 39, 55 and accompanying text. Second, 
the anti-sweatshop movement has largely viewed sweatshops abroad and domestically as 
being two facets of the same problem. See, e.g., Piore, supra note 28, at 135. The Apparel 
Industry Partnership (AIP) was created to deal with both problems, and the resulting Fair 
Labor Association (FLA) inspects both domestic and foreign factories. See Bonacich & 
Appelbaum, supra at 242–43; Fair Labor Association Public Reporting, http://www.fair 
labor.org/all/transparency /reports.html (last visited Jan. 13, 2006). 
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plexities of international law.71 The United States currently is under 
no treaty obligation to hold its corporations accountable for their la-
bor conditions abroad, and enforcement mechanisms within host 
countries are weak.72 Nor do American courts currently provide an 
effective venue for anti-sweatshop advocates to take U.S.-based corpo-
rations to task for their abuses abroad.73 Private initiatives, such as 
corporations adopting codes of conduct, have had only limited suc-
cess.74 The following section explores these issues in greater detail. 
A. Domestic Sweatshops 
 Due to the lack of effective public enforcement of labor laws, anti-
sweatshop advocates have attempted to use the courts to make corpo-
rations accountable, and also to advocate for new, more effective 
laws.75 Both strategies have had mixed results thus far.76
 Strong federal labor laws address the problematic conditions of do-
mestic sweatshops, but current enforcement efforts are not sufªcient to 
conquer the problem.77 The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA) 
established within the United States a minimum wage, a forty-hour 
work week, overtime compensation, and a prohibition of child labor.78 
It also included the “Hot Goods” provision, which makes it a crime for 
any person to transport or sell an item made in a factory that violated 
any of the above provisions.79 Strong governmental enforcement of the 
“Hot Goods” provision virtually eliminated sweatshops in the United 
States from the 1930s to the 1970s.80 Afterwards, the “Hot Goods” pro-
vision fell into disuse until Clinton Administration Labor Secretary 
Robert Reich began enforcing it again in the early 1990s as a way to 
hold manufacturers, as well as shop owners, liable.81 The Department 
                                                                                                                      
71 See infra notes 119–31 and accompanying text. 
72 See infra notes 113–18 and accompanying text. 
73 See infra notes 119–25 and accompanying text. 
74 See Gillen, supra note 39, at 1064. 
75 Ross, supra note 24, at 31; Moberg, supra note 21, at 15–19. 
76 Moberg, supra note 21, at 15–19. 
77 Id. at 18. 
78 Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 206, 207 (2005). 
79 Id. § 215. The Department of Labor can bring suit against such persons, with penal-
ties including a $10,000 ªne and jail time. Id. § 216(a). It also establishes a cause of action 
for employees to sue and receive double their unpaid minimum wage or unpaid overtime 
compensation, plus attorney’s fees. Id. § 216(b). 
80 Moberg, supra note 21, at 18. 
81 Bonacich & Appelbaum, supra note 70, at 228. While sweatshop owners are typically 
the ones to violate wage and hour provisions, clothing manufacturers are usually able to 
escape liability by claiming that they only contract for work with these owners and are not 
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of Labor (DOL) has used this technique to force manufacturers to sign 
compliance agreements guaranteeing that they would only work with 
contractors who comply with the FLSA, and promising to monitor to 
ensure conformity.82 Although these compliance agreements have re-
covered 1.3 million dollars in back wages for more than 3000 sweatshop 
workers in California alone, the DOL’s approach has only impacted a 
small portion of the sweatshop industry.83 This is due primarily to lim-
ited resources—the DOL has only 800 inspectors nation-wide and con-
ducts only 300 investigations per year for the more than the estimated 
22,000 sweatshops in the nation.84 Thus, anti-sweatshop advocates must 
turn to some mechanism of private enforcement to meaningfully alle-
viate domestic sweatshop conditions.85
 The anti-sweatshop movement has had greater success using the 
court system to hold manufacturers accountable for domestic sweat-
shop conditions.86 Many activists assist sweatshop workers to initiate 
suits based on violations of the FLSA wage and hours provisions, hop-
ing to set useful precedent to hold retailers accountable.87 For exam-
ple, the captive Thai workers from El Monte initiated a suit against the 
retailers of clothing they had manufactured, claiming that the retailers 
were negligent per se based on the “Hot Goods” provision.88 When the 
retailers attempted to have this claim dismissed, the judge ruled the 
claim was viable, leaving this avenue open as a means of holding retail-
ers and manufacturers accountable to future plaintiffs.89
                                                                                                                      
actually responsible for the conditions therein. Id. The “Hot Goods” provision, on the 
other hand, holds liable any person who tries to transport goods made in these forbidden 
conditions, whether they knew about the conditions or not. 29 U.S.C. § 216(a). As the 
manufacturers are typically the ones responsible for moving the garments across interstate 
lines, they are usually held liable. Bonacich & Appelbaum, supra note 70, at 228. 
82 Bonacich & Appelbaum, supra note 70, at 229–30. 
83 Id. at 236; Ross, supra note 24, at 28–29. 
84 Bonacich & Appelbaum, supra note 70, at 233; Ross, supra note 24, at 28–29. The 
Bush Administration has continued many of the enforcement practices that Reich began in 
the 1990s, as the Department of Labor recovered $6 million in back pay for garment workers 
in 2002. Press Release, Dep’t of Labor, Labor Department Enforcement Reaches 10-Year 
High (Dec. 12, 2002), http://www.dol.gov/opa/media/press/esa/ESA2002694.htm. 
85 See Ross, supra note 24, at 28–29. 
86 Bonacich & Appelbaum, supra note 70, at 308–09. 
87 See id.; see, e.g., Bureerong v. Uvawas, 959 F. Supp. 1231, 1236 (D.Cal. 1997). 
88 Bureerong, 959 F. Supp. at 1236. 
89 Id. at 1236–39. The defendants challenged this claim early on, and the judge al-
lowed it to be dismissed based on insufªciency of evidence because the plaintiffs had not 
alleged all four elements of negligence per se under California law. Id. at 1236–37. The 
claim was dismissed without prejudice, however, because the judge decided that even 
though the “Hot Goods” provision did not explicitly create a private form of action, prece-
dent allowed federal and state statutes to set the standard of care in state negligence per se 
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 The utility of such lawsuits is limited, however, because anti-sweatshop 
activists often face difªculty in ªnding workers who are willing to sue.90 
Many sweatshop workers in the United States are illegal immigrants who 
fear deportation if they come forward.91 The situation is exacerbated by 
the 1986 Immigrant Reform and Control Act, which created higher 
penalties for employers who hire illegal immigrants, thus limiting the 
pool of employers willing to hire illegal immigrants.92 Therefore, im-
migrants are desperate for whatever work they ªnd; a fact exploited by 
employers who still hire illegal immigrants.93 These employers then can 
create illegal substandard working conditions because they know they 
are unlikely to be reported.94 Moreover, following the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Hoffman Plastics Compounds v. NLRB, few remedies may be 
available to illegal immigrants for certain workers’ rights violations.95 In 
Hoffman Plastics, the Supreme Court held that the National Labor Rela-
tions Board (NLRB) was not allowed to award backpay to an illegal 
                                                                                                                      
actions. Id. at 1237. Moreover, the court found that the FLSA was intended to protect indi-
vidual employees from certain injuries and therefore the “Hot Goods” provision may have 
been intended to do as well. Id. at 1237–78. 
90 See Farhan Haq, Critics Link Immigration Laws to Sweatshops, Inter Press Serv., Mar. 
26, 1996, ¶ 17. 
91 See id. Even legal immigrants face barriers to coming forward. Kate Berry, Garment 
Workers Face Another Extended Run in Sweatshop Suit, L.A. Bus. J., Mar. 29, 2004, at 11, avail-
able at http://lexis.com. One worker who joined a lawsuit against Forever 21, was black-
listed from all garment factories and slapped with a defamation countersuit that was even-
tually dropped. Id. 
92 Haq, supra note 90, ¶¶ 5–6. 
93 Id.¶ 5. 
94 See id. ¶ 6. 
95 See 535 U.S. 137, 140 (2002). In Hoffman Plastics, the majority of the Supreme Court 
found that the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) was not allowed to award backpay 
to an illegal alien even though he made out a successful National Labor Relations Act 
(NLRA) violation. Id. They reasoned that awarding backpay in this case was beyond the 
discretion of the NLRB, because it violated the spirit and intention of the Immigration 
Reform and Control Act of 1986 by encouraging future violations of immigration law. Id. 
Subsequent federal court decisions, however, have interpreted Hoffman Plastics very nar-
rowly, as foreclosing an award of backpay to illegal aliens only under the NLRA. See Rivera 
v. Nibco, 364 F.3d 1057, 1066 (9th Cir. 2004); Flores v. Amigon, 233 F. Supp. 2d 462, 463 
(E.D.N.Y. 2002). In Rivera, the 9th Circuit distinguished Hoffman from the Title VII case in 
front of it, reasoning that Hoffman Plastics limited the discretion of the NLRB, but not that 
of federal courts, who have the authority to interpret and weigh all laws. Rivera, 364 F.3d at 
1068. In Flores, the court found that Hoffman Plastics only applied to backpay for work that 
had not yet been performed due to illegal termination, not to work that had already been 
performed and not adequately compensated under the FLSA. Flores, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 
463. Moreover, many courts have limited the ability of defendants to request immigration 
status during discovery, believing such requests would chill the reporting of civil rights and 
wage violations. See Rivera, 364 F.3d at 1057. Thus, Hoffman Plastics’ impact is unclear. See 
id. at 1057, 1068; Flores, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 463. 
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alien ªred for being a union supporter because of his immigration 
status.96 Not only does Hoffman Plastics further deter lawsuits by illegal 
immigrants for other workplace violations, it suggests the fundamental 
reluctance on the part of courts to provide full labor rights to illegal 
immigrants.97
 Anti-sweatshop advocates also have the option of turning to the leg-
islative process to create state or federal laws to ease the problems they 
encounter in pursuing lawsuits.98 On the state level, union advocates 
have had some legislative success in creating joint liability for the 
manufacturers and the retailers complicit in the violation of labor 
laws.99 In New York, for example, unions successfully lobbied for the 
Joint Liability Act of 1998, which holds manufacturers liable for sweat-
shop conditions at contracted factories.100 On the federal level, how-
ever, a similar bill called the Stop Sweatshops Bill, which would have 
held both retailers and manufacturers jointly liable for contractor 
sweatshop violations, was introduced in 1996 but never made it out of 
committee.101 Sweatshop advocates could also turn their attention to 
lobbying for increased Department of Labor funding for sweatshop law 
enforcement, or ensuring remedies for illegal immigrants who come 
forward with labor law violations.102 So far, however, the sweatshop 
                                                                                                                      
96 535 U.S. at 140. 
97 See id. at 150. But again, lower courts have been more protective of immigrant rights. 
See supra note 95. 
98 Bonacich & Appelbaum, supra note 70, at 309. 
99 See id. 
100 See N.Y. Lab. Law § 345-a(1) (Consol. 2004); Bonacich & Appelbaum, supra note 
70, at 309. The law sets up a damages level of 200% of the wages owed for repeating viola-
tors, and creates a misdemeanor felony for such violators, with a ªne of $20,000. Bo-
nacich & Appelbaum, supra note 70, at 245. 
101 Stop Sweatshops Act of 1996, H.R. 4166, 104th Cong. § 14A (1996); Bonacich & 
Appelbaum, supra note 70, at 244; Ross, supra note 24, at 31. 
102 See Hoffman Plastics Compounds v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 140 (2002); Bonacich & 
Appelbaum, supra note 70, at 31, 233. Another loophole ripe for legislative change is the 
special status of the American territories of Saipan and American Samoa. These territories 
are allowed to sew a “made in the U.S.A.” label onto garments and ship to the United 
States duty-free, but have the authority to set their own lower minimum wage and have 
more lax immigration policies. Jennifer Lin, Island Sweatshops Ignore U.S. Laws, Florida 
Times-Union, Feb. 28, 1998, at A1, available at http://lexis.com. These territories host 
many sweatshops, where “guest workers” live and work in deplorable conditions, and could 
be improved by a federal law applying federal immigration and labor laws to these islands. 
Id. While such laws have been proposed in Congress, the Republican Party in the House of 
Representatives has staunchly blocked these proposals. Id. Former House Majority Leader 
Dick Armey labeled such bills as counter to the “principles of the Republican Party.” Id. 
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movement has done little lobbying on the federal level for such 
changes.103
B. International Sweatshops 
 Anti-sweatshop advocates face greater difªculty in holding U.S.-
based corporations accountable for their actions in foreign nations, 
due to complexities in international law and the realities of free trade 
in the developing world.104 Host countries are unlikely to enforce ade-
quate labor conditions, despite international obligations to do so.105 
Nor do they have much incentive to compel adequate working condi-
tions, because international governmental organizations have shied 
away from dealing with labor issues.106 Compounding this problem, the 
United States thus far has been unwilling to apply its labor laws extra-
territorially to U.S.-based corporations abroad.107 Moreover, private en-
forcement mechanisms, such as corporate codes of conduct, have thus 
far been inadequate.108
 Host nations of sweatshops are reluctant to strongly enforce their 
own labor laws primarily due to economic competition with other de-
veloping nations.109 Developing nations are desperate for foreign in-
vestment, which could improve the economy and living conditions.110 
They compete with other developing nations to attract investment by 
offering incentives such as economic subsidies and minimal regula-
tion of labor and safety.111 Thus, despite treaties requiring these na-
tions to enforce certain labor standards, few countries do so for fear 
of a competitive disadvantage with other developing nations.112
 Nor do existing international trade or labor institutions provide a 
viable framework for the anti-sweatshop movement to ensure compli-
                                                                                                                      
103 See Lin, supra note 102, at A1. 
104 See Ayoub, supra note 18, at 424. 
105 Id. 
106 Larry A. DiMatteo, The DOHA Declaration and Beyond: Giving a Voice to Non-Trade 
Concerns Within the WTO Trade Regime, 36 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 95, 120 (2003). 
107 Ayoub, supra note 18, at 424. 
108 Gillen, supra note 39. 
109 Ayoub, supra note 18, at 422–23. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. For example, some 142 countries have ratiªed the Minimum Age Convention, 
which sets the minimum age for employment to be 15 years old, or in some exceptional 
cases, 14 years old. Minimum Age Convention, June 26, 1973, ILO Doc. C138. Among the 
signatories is Honduras, home to the notorious Kathie Lee sweatshop scandal involving 
child workers as young as twelve years old. See id.; supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
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ance with labor standards.113 The World Trade Organization (WTO), 
which has the power to sanction member countries for unfair trade 
practices, has not deªned ‘unfair trade practices’ to include labor 
rights issues.114 While the United States and the European Union have 
pushed for such a deªnition, delegates from developing countries have 
successfully prevented the adoption of trade sanctions to enforce labor 
standards.115 Instead, the WTO has delegated jurisdiction over labor 
issues to the International Labor Organization (ILO), a United Nations 
afªliated agency that sets international labor standards through a series 
of international conventions.116 Although the ILO has broad power to 
sanction signatory nations that violate a convention, it has rarely in-
voked this power, and instead has sought compliance through public 
pressure and threats of lessened privileges within the ILO.117
 This failure of the international community to deal with the prob-
lem of sweatshops has led many activists to try to use the American 
court system to hold U.S.-based corporations accountable for labor 
rights abuses abroad.118 These activists have had limited success, how-
ever, because courts are generally reluctant to apply American labor 
                                                                                                                      
113 See Ayoub, supra note 18, at 417–20. 
114 DiMatteo, supra note 106, at 97. Nonetheless, the WTO allows countries to pass laws 
that restrict imports for reasons that protect public morals and safety concerns. Id. at 126. 
Thus, it is possible that the United States could circumvent the current deªnition of “un-
fair trade practices” by passing a law requiring imported products be produced in certain 
labor conditions, if such a law was explicitly for the purpose of protecting safety and public 
morals. See id. Such a law might survive a WTO challenge on these grounds. See id. 
115 Id. at 121. One way to reform the WTO would be to construe the International La-
bor Organization convention violations as social dumping (article VI). Id. at 125. Social 
dumping is the idea that labor violations are an unfair subsidy on the cost of a country’s 
products, putting other countries that do avoid labor violations at a competitive disadvan-
tage. Id. at 125–26. The WTO currently has provisions that allow dumping to give rise to a 
cause of action within WTO jurisdiction. Id. Thus, including labor violations as dumping 
might provide a cause of action to bring countries with many labor violations to task. See id. 
116 Balthazar, supra note 18, at 699, 701–02; DiMatteo, supra note 106, at 123. 
117 Kimberly Ann Elliot & Richard B. Freeman, Can Labor Standards Improve 
Under Globalization? 102 (2003). The ILO has broad power to impose economic and 
other sanctions, although it has never actually exercised this power. Id. at 103. While the 
ILO often threatens to sanction countries to comply, it has only actually sanctioned a 
country once. Id. at 104. Complaints were brought against Burma for forced labor in 1996, 
and, after years of continued non-compliance, in 2000, the ILO imposed sanctions against 
Burma. Id. at 105. These sanctions called on member states to “review their relationship 
with the Government of Myanmar and to take appropriate measures.” Id. Most nations 
took no action, however, and forced labor continues in Burma to this day. Id. at 106. The 
ILO rarely takes strong measures because most ILO member nations balk at imposing 
economic sanctions. See id. 
118 Balthazar, supra note 18, at 714. 
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laws extraterritorially.119 The plain language of some labor laws, such as 
the FLSA, explicitly excludes application of the law in a “foreign coun-
try.”120 Moreover, courts will presume that a law applies only in the 
United States unless there is an explicit statement of Congress’ intent 
to apply a law extraterritorially.121 For example, in Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission v. Arabian America Oil Co. (Aramco), the Supreme 
Court found that Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act did not protect 
American citizens working for American corporations abroad because 
the language of the bill never stated its intent to apply extraterritori-
ally.122 Congress quickly responded by amending Title VII to deªne 
“employee” as “a citizen of the United States,” which provided the nec-
essary explicit intent.123 Following this congressional action, Title VII 
became the only American labor law to apply abroad.124 Its utility in 
compensating for sweatshop abuses abroad is limited, however, because 
it applies only to American citizens.125
 Although Congress has passed laws that grant foreign nationals 
certain legal rights with regard to labor conditions internationally, la-
bor activists have faced resistance within the U.S. court system in en-
forcing such laws.126 For example, Congress amended the U.S. General-
ized System of Preferences (GSP)—a trade act that allows products 
from developing countries duty-free access to the U.S.—to give devel-
oping countries beneªts only if they were taking steps to improve labor 
conditions for workers.127 When unions ªled suit against the federal 
government for failing to enforce these provisions, however, their suit 
was dismissed based on lack of standing, thus limiting the availability of 
the GSP to protect foreign workers.128 Similarly, labor activists have 
faced great difªculty in using the Alien Torts Claims Act (ATCA), which 
allows aliens to bring a tort claim based on a violation of a U.S. treaty 
                                                                                                                      
119 Mark Gibney & R. David Emerick, The Extraterritorial Application of United States Law 
and the Protection of Human Rights, 10 Temp. Int’l & Comp. L.J. 123, 133 (1996). 
120 29 U.S.C. § 213(f) (2005). 
121 Gibney & Emerick, supra note 119, at 132. 
122 499 U.S. 244, 246–47 (1991). 
123 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (2005); Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102–166, 
§ 109(a), 105 Stat. 1071 (1991). 
124 Gibney & Emerick, supra note 119, at 123–34. 
125 See id. at 134. 
126 See Balthazar, supra note 18, at 707–12. 
127 Id. at 707–08. Speciªcally, these rights were supposed to include freedom of associa-
tion, the right to organize, a prohibition on forced labor, and acceptable minimum wages 
and conditions, and minimum age for employment. Id. at 708. 
128 Id. at 712. 
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against U.S. nationals.129 Although the ATCA has been successfully 
used against foreign ofªcials involved in human rights violations, the 
courts have never allowed an ATCA claim against a U.S.-based corpora-
tion for labor rights abuses, due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction, 
lack of standing, and lack of state action.130
 Furthermore, the United States has no international obligation to 
regulate the actions of U.S.-based corporations abroad that violate in-
ternational treaties.131 The United States is not a signatory to the In-
ternational Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights 
(ICESC), the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against 
Women (CEDAW) or the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(CRC)—the three fundamental international treaties that address la-
bor rights.132 The United States also has refused to ratify ten of the 
eleven basic labor rights conventions of the ILO.133 Ratiªcation of these 
treaties would at least form a basis for governmental responsibility to 
regulate the actions of U.S.-based corporations and perhaps strengthen 
the possibility of a successful claim under the Alien Torts Claims Act.134 
Absent such a legal basis to take American corporations to task for la-
bor violations abroad, labor activists have had to search for other ways 
to regulate corporate conduct. 
                                                                                                                      
129 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2005). 
130 Logan Michael Breed, Regulating Our 21st-Century Ambassadors: A New Approach to 
Corporate Liability for Human Rights Violations Abroad, 42 Va. J. Int’l L. 1005, 1014, 1015–23 
(2002) (ªnding the ATCA not to be an effective vehicle to regulate the conduct of Ameri-
can corporations abroad). 
131 Ayoub, supra note 18, at 398, Balthazar, supra note 18, at 708. 
132 Ayoub, supra note 18, at 398. While these treaties lack sanctioning ability, they form 
the basis of obligations for signatory nations to pass laws banning child labor (CRC), estab-
lishing safe working conditions (CEDAW, ISESC) and ensuring that workers receive an 
adequate wage (ISESC). Id. at 414–16. The treaties suggest that nations must regulate the 
conduct of corporations based in their country as well. Id. Currently, however, these cove-
nants are treated mostly as statements of purpose. Balthazar, supra note 18, at 698. Profes-
sor Ayoub suggests, however, that the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, 
which the U.S. has signed, creates a duty for the United States to regulate the behavior of 
U.S.-based corporations and their subsidiaries abroad in terms of labor conditions. See 
Ayoub, supra note 18, at 398–99. 
133 Balthazar, supra note 18, at 708. The United States has signed the Abolition of 
Forced Labor Convention, but has refused to ratify conventions dealing with freedom of 
association, equality of opportunity and treatment, and others. Id. at 708–09. The United 
States has maintained that it does not need to ratify these conventions because it has al-
ready passed domestic laws that guarantee labor rights exceeding those mandated by the 
conventions. Id. at 708. The ILO cannot enforce the standards against a country that has 
not signed the convention. Id. at 700. 
134 See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2005); Balthazar, supra note 18, at 698. 
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 Increasingly, labor activists have turned to pressuring corporations to 
adopt codes of conduct, which are private initiatives in which corpora-
tions set standards for the labor conditions of their factories abroad.135 
Anti-sweatshop codes of conduct typically mandate that the corporation 
will only do business with a contractor who eschews child labor or 
forced labor, sets a minimum wage and maximum hour caps, and 
maintains some level of health and safety in the workplace.136 Many 
corporations have adopted these codes, often after negative publicity 
generated by the anti-sweatshop movement, in an effort to show con-
sumers that they do care about sweatshop conditions.137 Nonetheless, 
these codes generally lack effective monitoring and enforcement 
mechanisms, and thus actually do little to improve sweatshop condi-
tions.138 Generally, monitoring is done by employees of the corpora-
tion, who are biased and unlikely to report factory conditions accu-
rately.139 If a corporation does ªnd violations within its factories, there 
are no mechanisms to make these violations public, and so the corpora-
tion faces few sanctions.140 Moreover, when a corporation does ªnd a 
violation, their reaction is often to terminate their contract with the 
offending factory, effectively punishing the workers who reported the 
violations by eliminating their jobs.141
 The Fair Labor Association (FLA), a nonproªt organization that 
provides a uniªed code of conduct and monitoring for many compa-
nies, was created to address some of the problems with individual codes 
of conduct.142 The FLA grew out of the Apparel Industry Partnership 
(AIP), a taskforce of garment manufacturers, unions and human rights 
groups created by President Clinton in 1996 to investigate the sweat-
shop issue.143 In 1998, the AIP taskforce created the FLA to run a moni-
                                                                                                                      
135 Balthazar, supra note 18, at 718. The practice is modeled on the Sullivan Principles, 
a code of conduct mandating nondiscrimination policies that was adopted by twelve U.S.-
based ªrms doing business in South Africa during the anti-apartheid movement. Id. at 
716–17. 
136 Ayoub, supra note 18, at 403–04; Gillen, supra note 39, at 1069–70. 
137 See Su-Ping Lu, Corporate Codes of Conduct and the FTC: Advancing Human Rights 
Through Deceptive Advertising Law, 38 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 603, 612–13 (2000). 
138 Ayoub, supra note 18, at 405. 
139 Id. at 405–06. 
140 Id. at 405. 
141 Bonacich & Appelbaum, supra note 70, at 306. This is exactly what happened dur-
ing an NLC campaign against The GAP in 1995. Id. After making public violations at a 
GAP contracted factory, GAP announced it would take its work away from that factory. Id. 
142 Appelbaum & Dreier, supra note 21, at 71–72; Moberg, supra note 21, at 18–19. 
143 Bonacich & Appelbaum, supra note 70, at 242–43; Appelbaum & Dreier, supra note 
21, at 74. The garment industry members of the AIP generally were companies who had 
been the target of media campaigns exposing sweatshop practices in these factories. See 
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toring system for member companies based on a uniªed code of con-
duct, and make the results public.144 Several corporations in the ap-
parel industry have embraced the FLA as a way to demonstrate their 
commitment to the sweatshop issue to the public.145
 Nonetheless, many in the anti-sweatshop movement doubt the le-
gitimacy of the FLA.146 The AIP-member unions and the Interfaith 
Center of Corporate Responsibility dropped out of the FLA, claiming 
that the code of conduct was far too lax because it denied workers a 
living wage and set the maximum number of working hours per week 
at sixty.147 The code of conduct also allows contractors to evade this 
maximum number of hours in “extraordinary business circumstances,” 
and bars child labor only below the age of fourteen.148 The FLA’s moni-
toring mechanism has also been criticized because companies get to 
choose their external monitors, who examine only ªve percent of the 
company’s factories and are not required to disclose the locations of 
inspected factories.149
 Similar difªculties arise in the efforts to improve sweatshops within 
the United States and abroad. In both arenas, public enforcement of 
labor laws has not been effective at eradicating the problem.150 Do-
mestically, the federal government has not allotted sufªcient funds to 
fully enforce the law.151 Internationally, host countries are reluctant to 
enforce their own laws, and multinational enforcement mechanisms 
are weak.152 Nor has private enforcement been fully effective in either 
                                                                                                                      
Appelbaum & Dreier, supra note 21, at 74. They were Nike, Reebok, L.L. Bean, Liz Clai-
borne, Patagonia, Phillips-Van Heusen, Wal-Mart’s Kathie Lee brand, and Nicole Miller. Id. 
Union representatives were UNITE, the AFL-CIO, and the Retail Wholesale and Depart-
ment Store Union. Id. Lastly, the AIP included several nonproªt groups, the National Con-
sumer’s League, Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility, International Labor Rights 
Fund, Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Business for Social Responsibility, and the 
Robert Kennedy Memorial Center for Human Rights. Id. 
144 Bonacich & Appelbaum, supra note 70, at 243–44. The FLA published its ªrst 
round of monitoring of member companies on its website in June 2003. Aaron Bernstein, 
Sweatshops: Finally, Airing the Dirty Linen, Bus. Week, June 23, 2003, at 100. 
145 Gillen, supra note 39, at 1070. 
146 See Moberg, supra note 21, at 16–18. 
147 Bonacich & Appelbaum, supra note 70, at 244. 
148 Gillen, supra note 39, at 1075–76, 1083. 
149 Id. at 1091; Bernstein, supra note 144. While the FLA monitors few factories and 
does not disclose the name of such factories, it does publicize on its website speciªc results 
of factory inspections broken down by company. See Fair Labor Association, supra note 70. 
150 See supra notes 77–84, 118–25 and accompanying text. 
151 See supra notes 84–85 and accompanying text. 
152 See supra notes 109–17 and accompanying text. 
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arena.153 In the United States, advocates have had some success, but 
their efforts are hindered due to the difªculty in ªnding workers to 
come forward.154 Internationally, advocates have struggled to ªnd a 
vehicle to enforce labor standards in American courts, and the use of 
codes of conduct such as the FLA have thus far been inadequate in 
curbing the problem.155 Since public enforcement seems to be weak, 
activists need an effective method to privately enforce labor stan-
dards.156 Thus, suits such as Kasky, which use speech as the grounds 
for a suit, may provide an alternative that activists could utilize to en-
courage corporations to enact meaningful changes. 
III. Kasky’s Effect on Commercial Speech 
 Considering the dearth of effective techniques to reign in sweatshop 
abuses both abroad and at home, Kasky may provide an innovative 
cause of action for sweatshop activists to hold corporations account-
able.157 Understanding Kasky’ s importance requires a brief overview of 
the commercial speech doctrine, speciªcally focusing on deªnitions of 
commercial speech. 
A. Commercial Speech Doctrine: Deªnitions 
 Modern jurisprudence is clear that commercial speech is protected 
by the First Amendment at a lower level than other kinds of speech,158 
                                                                                                                      
153 See supra notes 86–97, 126–30, 135–49 and accompanying text. 
154 See supra notes 86–97 and accompanying text. 
155 See supra notes 118–31, 135–49 and accompanying text. 
156 See supra notes 86–97, 118–31, 135–49 and accompanying text. 
157 See Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 262 (Cal. 2002). 
158 Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law Principles and Policies 903 (2d ed. 
2002). This lesser level of protection gives the government greater latitude to regulate 
commercial speech. Id. Until the 1970s, the Supreme Court had held that commercial 
speech was not protected at all by the First Amendment. See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 
U.S. 52, 54–55 (1942); Chemerinsky, supra at 1044. In Bigelow v. Virginia, however, the 
Court reversed this long-held conclusion, ªnding that a state law prohibiting advertise-
ments of abortion services was unconstitutional. 421 U.S. 809, 829 (1975); Chemerinsky, 
supra at 1045. Since then, the Court has protected commercial speech in certain settings, 
developing what is essentially a four part intermediate scrutiny test to determine if gov-
ernment regulation is constitutional. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 
447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980); Chemerinsky, supra at 1058. First, a court must determine 
whether the commercial speech is false or misleading, or concerning illegal activities, and 
thus is not protected by the First Amendment. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. If the speech 
is protected by the First Amendment, the court then must determine if the government’s 
interest in restricting such speech is substantial. Id. If it is substantial, the court must then 
determine whether the law in question “directly advances” this asserted government inter-
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but the Supreme Court has never given a clear or comprehensive 
deªnition of commercial speech.159 In an early treatment of the issue, 
the Court considered commercial speech to be a statement that “pro-
pose[s] a commercial transaction.”160 This deªnition is vague and 
probably overly narrow, as it would exclude descriptions of products 
and services that the Supreme Court later found to be commercial 
speech.161 In Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Com-
mission, the Court deªned commercial speech in a different way, as an 
“expression related solely to the economic interests of the speaker 
and its audience.”162 This deªnition is probably overly broad, because 
it might implicate areas traditionally fully protected by the First 
Amendment, such as a newspaper or a book publishing company.163 
The Court’s most clear deªnition of commercial speech came in Bol-
ger v. Young Drug Products Corp., where the Court deªned commercial 
speech under a totality of circumstances test.164 This test considers 
whether the speech is some sort of advertisement, whether it refers to 
a speciªc product, and whether the speaker had an economic motiva-
tion for making the speech.165 Nonetheless, the Bolger test may be too 
narrow in terms of the word “advertisement.”166 While Bolger suggests 
that an advertisement is deªned as speech occurring within a tradi-
tional print/media setting, the Court has since expanded commercial 
                                                                                                                      
est. Id. If the law does directly advance the interest, the court must also inquire as to 
whether the law is “more extensive than necessary” to achieve this government interest. Id. 
159 Chemerinsky, supra note 158, at 1047–48. 
160 Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 762 
(1976). In each case, the Court tends to invent a deªnition which best ªts with the product 
in question. See id. at 749. In Virginia State Board, a Virginia law forbid pharmacists from 
advertising the price of prescription drugs. Id. In that case, the speech in question really 
did “no more than propose a commercial transaction” because it was literally an offer of a 
price. See id. at 762. 
161 Chemerinsky, supra note 158, at 1047. Subsequent cases have recognized items 
such as an alcohol content label on a beer bottle, statements on a business card, and 
statements on a ªnancial letterhead as commercial speech, which all fall beyond the nar-
row purview of proposing a commercial transaction. See Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 
U.S. 476, 481–82 (1995) (alcohol label); Ibanez v. Florida Dep’t of Bus. & Prof’l Regula-
tion Bd. of Accountancy, 512 U.S. 136, 138, 142 (1990) (business cards and letterhead). 
162 Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 561. 
163 Chemerinsky, supra note 158, at 1048. 
164 463 U.S. 60, 66–67 (1983). 
165 Id. The court found that the combination of all three factors in this case was enough 
to determine that it was commercial speech, while no one factor on its own was enough to 
support that conclusion. Id. 
166 Chemerinsky, supra note 158, at 1048. 
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speech to include some speech that occurs outside a traditional adver-
tising format.167
 Despite the ambiguity of the deªnition of commercial speech, the 
Supreme Court has clearly held that only truthful commercial speech is 
protected by the First Amendment.168 Thus, the states and the federal 
government are allowed to regulate false and misleading advertising 
without any interference.169 Although most false speech is protected,170 
false commercial speech differs from other kinds of false speech in 
fundamental ways that justiªes its unprotected status.171 The truthful-
ness of commercial speech can be more easily veriªed than other kinds 
of speech because commercial speech is typically objective information 
that the advertiser possesses.172 Further, commercial speech is seen as 
less likely to be chilled than other kinds of speech because of the mo-
tive of commercial speakers.173 And lastly, commercial speech is in-
                                                                                                                      
167 See, e.g., Ibanez v. Fla. Dep’t of Bus. & Prof’l Regulation Bd. of Accountancy, 512 
U.S. 136, 142 (1990) (accepting statements on business cards and a letterhead as commer-
cial speech); Bolger, 463 U.S. at 66. In Bolger, the speech in question was mass mailings to 
the public that included ºyers promoting condoms and discussing the beneªts of contra-
ceptives in general. Id. at 62. This ªts into a more traditional conception of an advertise-
ment. See id. at 66. 
168 See Bolger, 463 U.S. at 69 (ªnding that “the State may deal effectively with false, de-
ceptive, or misleading sales techniques”); Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 
447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980) (ªnding that “[f]or commercial speech to come within that pro-
vision [of the First Amendment], it at least must concern lawful activity and not be mis-
leading”); Chemerinsky, supra note 158, at 1054. This idea is so universally accepted that 
it has become incorporated into the ªrst part of the Central Hudson test. See supra note 158. 
Interestingly, the Court has come to this conclusion even though the Supreme Court has 
never directly heard a challenge to a false advertising law on First Amendment grounds. 
Chemerinsky, supra note 158, at 1054. 
169 Bolger, 463 U.S. at 69; Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. 748, 771–72 (1976). 
170 See, e.g., N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271–73 (1964) (ªnding First Amend-
ment protection for false statements contained in an editorial advertisement). 
171 Chemerinsky, supra note 158, at 1054–55. 
172 Va. State Bd., 425 U.S. at 772 n.24 (concluding, “[t]he truth of commercial speech, 
for example, may be more easily veriªable by its disseminator than, let us say, news report-
ing or political commentary, in that ordinarily the advertiser seeks to disseminate informa-
tion about a speciªc product or service that he himself provides and presumably knows 
more about than anyone.” ); see also id. at 777 (Stewart, J., concurring) (concluding that, 
“[t]he commercial advertiser generally knows the product or service he seeks to sell and is 
in a position to verify the accuracy of his factual representations before he disseminates 
them. The advertiser’s access to the truth about his product and its price substantially 
eliminates any danger that governmental regulation of false or misleading price or prod-
uct advertising will chill accurate and nondeceptive commercial expression.”). 
173 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 499 (1996) (ªnding that “the 
greater ‘hardiness’ of commercial speech, inspired as it is by the proªt motive, likely di-
minishes the chilling effect that may attend its regulation”); Va. State Bd., 425 U.S. at 772 
n.24. 
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tended to sell products and increase proªts, so even if the false com-
mercial speech is regulated, commercial speakers will continue to speak 
in order to continue selling.174 Moreover, false commercial speech is 
uniquely harmful because it distorts the marketplace by misleading 
consumers.175 The government has a right to protect consumers from 
economic harms that stem from Congress’ power to regulate commer-
cial transactions in general.176
 One area of uncertainty within the commercial speech doctrine 
is what level of protection should be given to expressions that com-
bine commercial and non-commercial speech.177 The Court has fre-
quently commented that a commercial speaker who “links a product 
to a current public debate” does not necessarily gain full protection of 
the First Amendment.178 Otherwise, the Court has said, advertisers 
would be able to “immunize” false advertising from government over-
sight by linking the product to a current public debate.179 Nonethe-
less, in Riley v. National Federation of the Blind, the Supreme Court 
found that commercial speech and non-commercial speech were “in-
extricably intertwined” in such a way that the whole expression had to 
be fully protected by the First Amendment.180 Later, the Court limited 
this holding in Board of Trustees, State University of New York v. Fox, 
ªnding that commercial and noncommercial speech are “inextricably 
intertwined” only if a state or federal law mandates that the two kinds 
of speech have to be combined in the same statement.181 Due to these 
varying approaches, the issue of how courts should treat statements 
                                                                                                                      
174 Va. State Bd., 425 U.S. at 772 n.24. 
175 See Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 493 (1995) (Stevens, J., concurring) 
(holding that false advertising laws ensure that “that consumers are not led, by incomplete 
or inaccurate information, to purchase products they would not purchase if they knew the 
truth”). 
176 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 499 (Stevens, J., concurring) (concluding that “the 
State’s power to regulate commercial transactions justiªes its concomitant power to regu-
late commercial speech that is ‘linked inextricably’ to those transactions”). 
177 See, e.g., Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 795–96 (1988). 
178 Cent. Hudson Gas and Elec. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 563 n.5 (1980). 
179 Bolger v. Young Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 68 (1983) (reasoning “a com-
pany has the full panoply of protections available to its direct comments on public issues, 
so there is no reason for providing similar constitutional protection when such statements 
are made in the context of commercial transactions”). 
180 See Riley, 487 U.S. at 795–96. There a North Carolina statute mandated that, prior to 
a solicitation, professional fundraisers must declare the percentage of money their com-
pany raised that actually went to charity. Id. at 786 n.2. 
181 See Bd. of Trs., State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 474 (1989). Such a law ex-
isted in Riley. See Riley, 487 U.S. at 786 n.2. 
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that combine commercial and noncommercial speech remains am-
biguous.182
B. Kasky v. Nike in the California Supreme Court 
 The California Supreme Court took on Kasky precisely because 
the fact pattern invoked the unclear deªnition of commercial speech 
and the difªcult situation of speech that combines commercial and 
noncommercial elements.183 Kasky sued Nike under California’s anti-
competition law and false advertising laws, alleging in his complaint 
that Nike made statements about its labor practices to the public of 
California that were false and misleading.184 Speciªcally, Nike claimed 
that its workers abroad received on average double the local mini-
mum wage, and worked in conditions that were in compliance with 
local safety laws.185 Nike made these claims in press releases, letters to 
the editor, letters to university presidents and athletic directors, and 
newspaper advertisements, along with statements of opinion.186 In the 
trial court, Nike ªled demurrers to the complaint, alleging that appli-
cation of California’s anti-competition and false advertising laws in 
this case was barred by the U.S. Constitution because Nike’s state-
ments were protected under the First Amendment.187 The trial court 
dismissed Kasky’s claim, and the Court of Appeals afªrmed, ªnding 
that Nike’s statements were not commercial speech.188
                                                                                                                      
182 See Fox, 492 U.S. at 474; Riley, 487 U.S. at 786 n.2. 




187 Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 854, 857 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000). Nike challenged 
Kasky at the complaint stage, meaning no discovery or trial had been conducted. Id. at 858. 
Thus, when Nike ªled a motion to have the complaint dismissed, the trial court up to the 
Supreme Court had to assume that Kasky’s allegations within the complaint were true— 
i.e., that Nike had indeed misrepresented facts about labor conditions in its factories. Id. at 
857 (“On appeal from a judgment of dismissal after a demurrer is sustained without leave 
to amend, appellate courts assume the truth of all facts properly pleaded by the plaintiff-
appellant.”). But at this point no evidence had been introduced to show that Nike had 
actually made false statements. Id. 
188 See id. at 857, 863. The Court of Appeals believed that Nike’s statements did not 
convey information about their products, but instead were intended to create a “favorable 
corporate image.” Id. at 860. The court found Nike’s statements were not made as a prod-
uct advertisement but as part of the public debate about labor practices in the context of 
globalization. Id. at 860–61. Moreover, the court believed that many of the expressions 
Kasky challenged did not meet two of the Bolger commercial speech deªnition factors: 
advertising format and reference to speciªc product. Id. at 860. 
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 The California Supreme Court reversed, ªnding Nike’s statements 
to be commercial speech in a controversial opinion that sidestepped 
the unclear deªnitions of commercial speech entirely.189 Instead, the 
California Supreme Court created a new test to determine a subset of 
commercial speech: false commercial speech.190 Due to the procedural 
stance of the case, a motion to dismiss the complaint, the California 
Supreme had to assume at the onset that Nike’s speech was indeed 
false.191 Thus, the court believed the question was not whether Nike’s 
speech was commercial or not, but whether it was false commercial 
speech or false noncommercial speech.192 Therefore, the court did not 
need to use the existing deªnitions for commercial speech.193 Since the 
U.S. Supreme Court treats false commercial speech differently than 
commercial speech in general, the California Supreme Court believed 
a deªnition for only false commercial speech could be construed from 
precedent.194 Using the rationale that false commercial speech should 
be unprotected, along with U.S. Supreme Court general deªnitions of 
commercial speech, the California Supreme Court created a three-part 
“limited-purpose” test to determine the existence of false commercial 
speech only.195
 To be false commercial speech under the limited purposes test, the 
ªrst two elements require that the speaker of the challenged expression 
must be engaged in commerce, and the intended audience must be 
potential buyers or customers of the speaker’s goods or services.196 The 
                                                                                                                      
189 Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 256, 262 (Cal. 2002). 
190 See id. The California Supreme Court labeled the limited-purpose test as identifying 
“whether particular speech may be subjected to laws aimed at prevented false advertising 
or other forms of commercial deception.” Id. at 256. For brevity and clarity’s sake, this 
Note describes the limited purpose test as identifying false commercial speech. Any speech 
that may constitutionally be regulated under false advertising laws must be false commer-
cial speech. See supra note 168 and accompanying text. To be clear, this deªnition does not 
determine the veracity of speech. See Kasky, 45 P.3d at 256. 
191 See id. at 247. Because the Supreme Court was ruling on a motion to dismiss at the 
complaint stage, the California Supreme Court had to accept for the purposes of review 
that Kasky’s allegations were true. See supra note 187 and accompanying text. Thus, the 
court had to assume Nike’s speech was false. See Kasky, 45 P.3d at 247. 
192 See id. at 256. False commercial speech is unprotected by the First Amendment 
which false noncommercial speech is generally fully protected by the First Amendment. See 
supra note 168 and accompanying text. 
193 Kasky, 45 P.3d at 256. While the court does not make its reasoning clear, it seems to 
believe that the deªnition of commercial speech is broader than the deªnition of false 
commercial speech. See id. 
194 See supra notes 168–76 and accompanying text. 
195 Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 256-58 (Cal. 2002). 
196 Id. at 256. 
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California Supreme Court derived these two elements from U.S. Su-
preme Court deªnitions of commercial speech.197 The court reasoned 
that these elements were implicit in the “commercial transaction” 
deªnition of commercial speech because it implies that commercial 
speech is a communication between a buyer and a seller.198 Moreover, 
the court found the Bolger deªnition, which included advertising and 
economic motivation of the speaker, also implies that the intended au-
dience must be consumers and the speaker must be someone engaged 
in commerce.199 Advertisements typically are speeches about products 
or services directed at potential consumers of those goods.200 The eco-
nomic motivation factor suggests that the speaker is engaged in com-
merce, hoping that the speech will lead to a commercial transaction.201
 If the ªrst two elements are met, a challenged expression is false 
commercial speech if the “factual content” of the speech is commercial 
in nature.202 The factual content is found to be commercial if it makes 
representations about the speaker’s products or services for the pur-
pose of promoting sales of that product or service.203 The California 
Supreme Court based this third element in part on the Bolger 
deªnition.204 The court argued that the third factor of the Bolger 
deªnition— referring to a speciªc product—has been interpreted very 
broadly to include many facts about goods and services beyond just 
price.205 This interpretation suggests that any factual content will be 
considered a “product reference.”206 The California Supreme Court 
also based this third element in the rationales for denying full First 
Amendment protection to false commercial speech.207 The U.S. Su-
preme Court has said that commercial speech is both easier to verify, 
                                                                                                                      
197 Id. Speciªcally, as mentioned below, the California Supreme Court made use of the 
Bolger deªnition and “commercial transaction” deªnition. Id. 
198 Id. 
199 Id. 




204 Id. at 256–57. 
205 Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 256-57 (Cal. 2002). The Supreme has interpreted 
references beyond just price, to things such as the alcohol content of a beer bottle, or 
statements on a business card or letterhead. See Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 
481–82 (1995); Ibanez v. Fla. Dep’t of Bus. and Prof’l Regulation Bd. of Accountancy, 512 
U.S. 136, 142 (1990). 
206 Kasky, 45 P.3d at 256–57. 
207 Id. at 257. 
2006] Free Speech to Have Sweatshops? 295 
and more hardy than other kinds of speech because it includes facts 
and is spoken in the pursuit of proªt.208
 The California Supreme Court then applied the test to Nike’s 
speech, and concluded that it was false commercial speech.209 The 
court held that Nike was indeed a commercial speaker as a large cor-
poration engaged in commerce of shoes and apparel.210 The court 
considered Nike’s intended audience to be consumers and would-be 
buyers—particularly those concerned about Nike’s sweatshop prac-
tices.211 Clearly, Nike’s letters to university presidents had Nike cus-
tomers as an intended audience, but the court found even Nike’s let-
ters to the editors, press releases, and advertisements were arguably 
intended to reach consumers.212 Lastly, and most importantly, the 
court held that the content of Nike’s speech included facts of a com-
mercial nature.213 In these letters, press releases, and advertisements, 
Nike had made factual representations about the working conditions 
in which Nike products were manufactured.214
 The California Supreme Court’s limited-purpose test is problem-
atic in that it relies on U.S. Supreme Court precedent on commercial 
speech but does not follow it.215 Despite the California Supreme 
Court’s insistence that the limited purposes test is grounded in prior 
cases, the court essentially conceived a brand-new test to determine a 
narrow slice of commercial speech, false commercial speech.216 By 
doing so, the California Supreme Court has created a bifurcated sys-
tem in which false commercial speech is deªned under the limited-
purpose test, and all other kinds commercial speech will be deªned 
                                                                                                                      
208 Id. 
209 Id. at 258. 
210 Id. 
211 Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 258 (Cal. 2002). 
212 Id. Kasky had in fact alleged that Nike’s actions were meant to increase proªt in his 
complaint. Id. As proof, he offered a letter from Nike to the editor saying, “during the 
shopping season, we encourage shoppers to remember that Nike is the industry’s leader in 
improving factory conditions.” Id. 
213 Id. 
214 Id. These statements of fact about labor conditions were presumably within Nike’s 
knowledge. Id. If nothing else, Nike is in the best position to verify the truth of these 
statements, having direct contact with subcontractors managing labor conditions. See id. 
Again, Nike’s purpose in making these statement was to make a proªt. Id. If regulation of 
Nike’s statements makes Nike attempt to verify its statements more carefully, the California 
Supreme Court believed that that was the very purpose of false advertising laws. Id. 
215 See id. at 256–58. 
216 See Kasky, 45 P.3d at 256. However, many pundits have missed this distinction—
believing that the California Supreme Court has created a new deªnition for commercial 
speech as a whole. See, e.g., Goldstein, supra note 16. 
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according to the U.S. Supreme Court’s commercial speech 
deªnitions.217 The California Supreme Court’s reasons for creating 
such a divide are unclear, especially because the U.S. Supreme Court 
has never indicated that false commercial speech should be deªned 
differently than other kinds of commercial speech.218 While the U.S. 
Supreme Court has held that false commercial speech has no First 
Amendment protection and truthful commercial speech does, the 
Court has never suggested that this distinction should lead to separate 
deªnitions.219 Thus, it is unclear why the California Supreme Court 
invented a new deªnition, instead of expanding interpretations of the 
existing commercial speech deªnitions to include Nike’s speech.220
 The California Supreme Court may have departed from precedent 
because Nike’s statements did not seem to be traditional commercial 
speech221 and yet clearly seemed to mislead consumers.222 The ration-
ales for denying First Amendment protection to false commercial 
speech seem to apply to Nike’s statements, even if traditional 
deªnitions of commercial speech do not.223 Nike is in the best position 
to verify what is happening in its own factories.224 Nike’s speech is un-
likely to be stiºed, as it wants to continue to sell shoes, and so has a mo-
tive to continue speaking.225 Regulation of the veracity of Nike’s com-
ments falls within longstanding governmental practice to regulate false 
representations of where and how a product is made.226 Moreover, al-
                                                                                                                      
217 See Kasky, 45 P.3d at 256–57. For example, this limited purposes test deªnition 
would not be used in cases that challenge statutes that prohibit certain kinds of commer-
cial speech—such as a law prohibiting the truthful publishing of alcoholic content on the 
label. See, e.g., Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 481–82 (1995). 
218See Bolger v. Young Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 69 (1983); Cent. Hudson Gas 
& Elec. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980). 
219 See Bolger, 463 U.S. at 69; Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. 
220 See Kasky, 45 P.3d at 256–58. But see Erwin Chemerinsky & Catherine Fisk, Nike v. 
Kasky and the Modern Commercial Speech Doctrine, 54 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1143, 1148 (2004) 
(arguing that Nike’s speech does ªt within the Bolger deªnition). 
221 Kasky, 45 P.3d at 247–48. Nike’s speech was not made in a traditional advertising 
format, and included statements of opinion and fact mixed together. See id. 
222 See id. at 258. The U.S. Supreme Court has long been concerned with protecting 
consumers in the marketplace. Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654, 679 (2003) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting). 
223 See Kasky, 45 P.3d at 258. 
224 Id. 
225 See id. This rationale does not mean that Nike will continuing saying untruthful 
things about its labor practices abroad, but rather that Nike will likely continue speaking 
about its shoes and sweatshop practices in general because it needs to advertise to survive. 
See id. 
226 Id. at 258–59. For example, the federal government prohibits false descriptions of 
the origin of products, and California prohibits misrepresentations that a product was 
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though Nike commingled its statements of fact with opinions about 
workers rights, the court found this should not immunize its factual 
allegations about how its products are made from being commercial 
speech.227 The California Supreme Court followed the U.S. Supreme 
Court to ªnd that the commercial and noncommercial elements of 
Nike’s speech were not inextricably intertwined because, following Fox, 
no law compelled Nike’s speech to be combined in the same forum.228
 Thus, the California Supreme Court’s opinion relied on the princi-
ples that underlay the commercial speech doctrine, although it did not 
strictly follow the deªnitions of commercial speech.229 That using the 
underlying principles could lead to a different result than existing 
deªnitions suggests that the current deªnitions of commercial speech 
are inadequate.230 Kasky raises several issues that existing commercial 
speech doctrine has not sufªciently explained: what speech outside of 
traditional advertising formats can be considered commercial;231 
whether Bolger and other commercial speech deªnitions are ade-
quate;232 and how to analyze expressions that contain both commercial 
speech and non-commercial speech.233 When Nike appealed the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court decision, pundits on both sides of the issue 
looked to the Supreme Court to clarify and update its commercial 
speech doctrine.234
                                                                                                                      
made by Native Americans or blind workers. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2005); Cal. Bus. & 
Prof. Code §§ 17520, 17569 (West 2005). 
227 See Bolger v. Young Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 68 (1983); Cent. Hudson Gas & 
Elec. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 563 n.5 (1980); Kasky, 45 P.3d at 260. 
228 See Kasky, 45 P.3d at 260. “No law required Nike to combine factual representation 
about its own labor practices with expressions of opinion about economic globalization, 
nor was it impossible for Nike to address those subjects separately.” Id. at 267. 
229 See id. at 256–58. 
230 See id. at 268 (Brown, J., dissenting). 
231 See Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 481–82 (1995); Ibanez v. Fla. Dep’t of 
Bus. & Prof’l Regulation Bd. of Accountancy, 512 U.S. 136, 142 (1990). 
232 See Kasky, 45 P.3d at 256. This is implicitly what the California Supreme Court sug-
gests by creating a new test. See id. 
233 See id. at 260, 266–67 (Chin, J., dissenting). The California Supreme Court believed 
that the presence of opinion on a public debate did not immunize the statements of fact, 
and moreover will not chill Nike’s opinions because they are not the subject of the lawsuit. 
Id. at 260. Chin’s dissent states that at the least Nike’s opinions are inextricably entwined 
with the statements of fact, so that the law cannot separately analyze one without looking 
at the other. Id. at 266–67. 
234 See Goldstein, supra note 16, at 63–64. 
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C. The U.S. Supreme Court’s Non-Decision 
 After granting certiorari to Kasky, hearing oral arguments and re-
ceiving thirty-one amicus briefs, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a per 
curiam opinion dismissing the writ of certiorari as improvidently 
granted.235 This decision meant that the Court had changed its mind 
about hearing the case in the ªrst place, and thus left the case’s im-
portant commercial speech questions unanswered.236 The concur-
rence, signed by Justices Stevens and Ginsburg, and joined in part by 
Justice Souter provided three procedural reasons for dismissing the 
writ:237 lack of ªnality,238 lack of standing,239 and to avoid premature 
adjudication of the novel First Amendment questions Kasky raises. 240 
                                                                                                                      
235 Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654, 655, 667 (2003). 
236 See id. at 655. 
237 Id. at 656, 658 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Souter joined only as to the third 
reason. Id. at 656, 663. 
238 See id. at 658. By law, the Supreme Court can only review cases in which there has 
been a ªnal judgement or dissent decree. See 28 U.S.C § 1257 (2005). The California Su-
preme Court’s decision in Kasky was to reverse and remand, which is not a ªnal decree. 
Nike, 539 U.S. at 658, 658–60 (Stevens, J., concurring). Nike had argued, however, that 
Kasky fell under an exception that allowed the Court to hear cases that are not ªnal if state 
courts have ªnally decided a federal issue, and reversal of this issue would end the litiga-
tion. See id. at 658–59. Stevens found this argument to be “theoretically” true, but only if 
the Court could ªnd all of Nike’s comments to be absolutely protected. Id. at 659. Due to 
the nature of the case, however, such an outcome was highly unlikely—the Court could 
construe some of the comments to be commercial and some not, or reverse in such a way 
that would give Kasky the option of amending his complaint. Id. at 660. In such scenarios 
more state proceedings would follow, and new First Amendment issues might arise. Id. 
Therefore, Kasky was not ªnal in such a way that fell within the exception. Id. 
239 Id. at 661–63. Justice Stevens found that neither party had the required injury 
needed for standing. Id. at 661. Kasky had no injury; indeed, Kasky had never claimed to 
suffer a personal injury when he initiated the suit. Id. Kasky had ªled as a private attorney 
general alleging no personal injury, but instead enforcing California laws on behalf of the 
public of California. Id. There was no ªnal judgement against Nike, so Nike had no injury 
in fact either. Id. Thus, Nike would not have been able to commence this case in federal 
court in the ªrst place. Id. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has adopted an exception to 
this rule when there is a state court judgement on a federal issue that causes injury to a 
party. See ASARCO Inc. v Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 623–24 (1989). Nike argued that it fell into 
this ASARCO exception. See Reply Brief for the Petitioners at 5–6, Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 
U.S. 654, 655, 667 (2003) (No. 02-575). Stevens found that ASARCO was distinguishable in 
the present case because ASARCO involved a ªnal declaratory judgement that a state law 
was illegal and so tangible legal rights were effected. Nike, 539 U.S. at 662 (Stevens, J., con-
curring). Since the judgement in Kasky was not ªnal, no legal rights were effected yet and 
so Nike was not injured. Id. 
240 Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 US. 654, 655, 663–64 (2003) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
Lastly, Stevens believed that Kasky was not the appropriate vehicle to explore important 
First Amendment issues. Id. at 663. Kasky was only at the pleading stage, lacking a factual 
record that would assist the Court greatly in such complicated and important commercial 
speech issues. See id. at 664–65. It is likely this last reason that convinced the Court to dis-
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Although both sides claimed victory in some of the concurrence and 
dissent opinions’ language, the real victory belonged to Marc Kasky as 
his lawsuit was allowed to go forward.241
 Although the dismissal of certiorari allowed the California Supreme 
Court’s decision on Kasky to stand, both the dissent and concurrence 
expressed disagreement with that decision.242 Both opinions high-
lighted the intermingling of commercial speech and noncommercial 
speech with Nike’s statements, an issue the California Supreme Court 
had quickly dismissed.243 The dissent believed that Nike’s speech had 
“predominant[ly]” noncommercial characteristics inextricably inter-
twined with commercial speech.244 Even the concurrence deªned 
Nike’s speech as “a blending of commercial speech, noncommercial 
speech and debate on an issue of public importance,” although the 
opinion did not suggest how to deal with such a “blending.”245 These 
opinions imply that the California Supreme Court’s limited purpose 
test was unnecessary. The limited-purpose test was meant to ªnd only 
false commercial speech, which the U.S. Supreme Court has found to 
merit no First Amendment protection.246 Both the dissent and concur-
rence at minimum would require some First Amendment protection 
                                                                                                                      
miss certiorari, as during oral argument the Justices were generally dismissive of the lack of 
standing and ªnality arguments. Transcript of Oral Argument at 31–49, Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 
539 U.S. 654, 655, 667 (2003) (No. 02-575). Moreover, Nike challenged the constitutional-
ity of the private attorney general provisions of California’s Unfair Competition Law in 
front of the Supreme Court although it had not raised this issue below. See Nike, 539 U.S. at 
664 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
241 See Linda Greenhouse, Nike Free Speech Case Is Unexpectedly Returned to California, N.Y. 
Times, June 29, 2003, at A16. Laurence Tribe, the esteemed law professor at Harvard who 
argued Nike’s appeal in front of the Court, commented that the concurrence’s language 
showed that Nike’s statements were not “garden variety commercial speech.” Id. Ohio Rep-
resentative Dennis Kuchinich claimed that the decision was a “victory for consumer pro-
tection and corporate accountability.” Id. 
242 See Nike, 539 U.S. at 663–64 (Stevens, J., concurring); Id. at 676 (Breyer, J., dissent-
ing). 
243 Nike, 539 U.S. at 663 (Stevens, J., concurring); Id. at 667 (Breyer, J., dissenting); 
Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 260 (Cal. 2002). 
244 Nike, 539 U.S. at 677 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer suggested that while 
false advertising laws are important, there was no difference in determining whether 
speech is commercial for the purposes of false advertising or other state intrusions. See id. 
at 679. Justice Breyer focused on both the format of the speech, and whether the speech 
links to a public debate are central, not peripheral. Id. at 678. Here, Justice Breyer believed 
that Nike’s speech was in a nontraditional advertising format and the links to a public de-
bate are central, so Nike’s speech was not “pure” commercial speech. Id. at 678–79. 
245 Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 US. 654, 663 (2003) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
246 See Kasky, 45 P.3d 243, 256 (2002). 
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for Nike’s speech due to the mixing of commercial and non-
commercial speech.247
 Nonetheless, the Court did restate its commitment to the principles 
of the commercial speech doctrine on which the California Supreme 
Court based its decision.248 The dissent, while ªnding that Nike’s 
speech was not commercial, reiterated the importance of false advertis-
ing law and the commercial speech doctrine as advancing important 
“public objectives.”249 The concurrence also seconded the California 
Supreme Court in that it does not mention the format of Nike’s com-
ments—an ad, letters to customers, etc.—as disqualifying it from being 
commercial speech, and instead mentioned the important governmen-
tal goal of consumer protection.250 Thus, had the U.S. Supreme Court 
ruled on the issue, it likely would have provided some lesser level of 
protection to Nike’s comments than full ªrst Amendment protection, 
which would have allowed some regulation.251
 Despite these hints that the California Supreme Court had not de-
cided Kasky correctly, the U.S. Supreme Court’s dismissal of certiorari 
led to the California Supreme Court’s decision becoming ªnal.252 A few 
months after the dismissal of certiorari, Kasky and Nike settled the 
case.253 The parties disclosed that Nike had agreed to donate $1.5 mil-
lion to the Fair Labor Association for worker development programs 
abroad.254 Thus, the California Supreme Court’s decision in Kasky is 
now precedent in that state, possibly handing advocates a powerful tool 
in their ªght against sweatshop conditions.255
                                                                                                                      
247 See Nike, 539 U.S. at 664 (Stevens, J., concurring); Id. at 679 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
248 See Nike, 539 U.S. at 664 (Stevens, J., concurring); Id. at 679 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
249 Id. at 678–79 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
250 Id. at 663–64 (Stevens, J., concurring). The dissent, however, believed that the for-
mat is a concern, suggesting that since Nike’s statements were not in “traditional advertis-
ing or labeling contexts,” it was not commercial speech. See id. at 677 (Breyer, J., dissent-
ing). 
251 See id. at 677 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
252 See Mokhiber, supra note 18. 
253 Id. The Supreme Court’s dismissal of certiorari meant the California Supreme 
Court’s orders to reverse and remand held. See id. However, the settlement came before 
discovery ever occurred in trial court. See id. 
254 Id. The FLA was not a party in Kasky’s suit. See Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 243 
(Cal. 2002). As far as can be determined, the donation to the FLA was made at Kasky’s 
request, in lieu of a payment towards him directly. See Mokhiber, supra note 18. This is in 
keeping with Kasky’s behavior in his previous lawsuits, in which he made no money. See 
Parloff, supra note 1, at 108. 
255 See Mokhiber, supra note 18. 
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IV. The Utility of Kasky-Style Lawsuits 
 Until the Supreme Court clariªes the deªnition of commercial 
speech, a Kasky-style lawsuit is a viable option for anti-sweatshop advo-
cates to try to hold corporations accountable for their sweatshop condi-
tions.256 Such a lawsuit would involve suing a corporation based not on 
their sweatshop conditions, but on the falsity of a statement in a press 
release, letter to the editor, etc. concerning labor conditions.257 On ªrst 
glance, a Kasky-style lawsuit may be an effective means of private en-
forcement because it evades many of the barriers anti-sweatshop advo-
cates have encountered using other techniques.258 Nonetheless, a 
Kasky-style lawsuit must overcome two difªcult issues: standing and 
remedies.259 Moreover, Kasky risks chilling the speech of corporations, 
which ultimately could be disadvantageous to sweatshop activists.260 A 
Kasky-style lawsuit gives a company two choices: improve sweatshop 
conditions or stop talking about sweatshop conditions at all.261 Only a 
nuanced and careful campaign on the part of anti-sweatshop advocates 
can lead to the former alternative.262
A. Kasky-style Lawsuits Compared to Other Techniques 
 At least in California, Kasky might allow false advertising and unfair 
competition laws to be used in an innovative way.263 A Kasky-style lawsuit 
would enable activists to sue corporations for making false statements 
                                                                                                                      
256 See Kasky, 45 P.3d at 262. 
257 See id. at 247–48. 
258See id. at 262; see, e.g., Balthazar, supra note 18, at 712–14. 
259 See Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17203, 17204, 17206 (West 2005) (requiring per-
sonal injury to ªle suit as a private attorney general in California, and limiting damages to 
compensation for that injury). 
260 See Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 271–72 (2002) (Brown, J., dissenting). Fearing 
lawsuits, companies might refrain from speaking about social issues and participating in 
forums such as the FLA that might eventually lead to positive change. See Bigge, supra note 
16, at 18. 
261 See Lu, supra note 137, at 628. The Federal Trade Commission could also legiti-
mately take an active role in prosecuting false advertising violations in order to improve 
sweatshop conditions. Id. at 604. 
262 See id. at 628. Companies will likely only improve sweatshop conditions if a well-
informed consumer public pressures them to do so, because otherwise companies will be 
tempted merely to stop talking about sweatshop issues. Id. If consumers make it known 
that their decisions are based on sweatshop conditions, companies will be more tempted to 
make changes. Id. 
263 See Kasky, 45 P.3d at 262. While Kasky’s holding is only precedent in California, it 
certainly is persuasive authority elsewhere, which could enable activists to expand Kasky’s 
holding to other states. See Bigge, supra note 16, at 17. 
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about sweatshop conditions, which in itself could be leverage to pres-
sure companies to improve these conditions.264 Moreover, the Califor-
nia Supreme Court’s decision found certain company “image enhanc-
ing” tools to be commercial speech even though they fell outside 
traditional advertising formats.265 Nike’s press releases, statements on 
its website, letters to the editor, letters to prominent customers and im-
age ads were all considered commercial speech because they included 
factual statements about how Nike products were made.266 Companies 
are more likely to make statements about sweatshop conditions in such 
formats, often responding to media or anti-sweatshop allegations of 
poor conditions, than in traditional advertising contexts.267 Since a 
company’s public image is seen as vital to business, this gives advocates 
a powerful tool to use false image-making statements against an offend-
ing company.268
 Kasky may be more effective than other methods of private en-
forcement because it circumvents many of the barriers that have tradi-
tionally prevented advocates from using the court system effectively.269 
Because Kasky deals with speech and not actions, it avoids many of the 
complex international problems anti-sweatshop activists have faced in 
using the court system.270 Activists have had difªculty because few la-
bor laws apply extraterritorially, and those laws that do are difªcult to 
enforce.271 Kasky, however, is a cause of action based on domestic law 
                                                                                                                      
264 See Bigge, supra note 16, at 17. Of course, prior to Kasky, advocates could sue based 
on express claims made in traditional advertising formats. See, e.g., Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 
§ 17500 (stating that it is unlawful for someone in the pursuit of commerce to make un-
true and misleading facts “in any newspaper or other publication, or any advertising de-
vice”). The problem was that companies often intermingle such speech with opinions, 
which have greater protection by the First Amendment. See Kasky, 45 P.3d at 260. Kasky 
holds, among other things, that this intermingling does not immunize the factual claims. 
Id. 
265 See Kasky, 45 P.3d at 260. 
266 See id. at 262. 
267 See Bigge, supra note 16, at 13. Nike’s response to allegations of sweatshop condi-
tions that sparked Kasky is the classic example of this. Id. In response to accusations in the 
media that Nike had been using sweatshop labor abroad, Nike began a media campaign to 
resurrect its image. Id. During this campaign, Nike made the comments that Kasky singled 
out as false and misleading. Id. 
268 See id. at 16. A company’s image is increasingly seen as important to their bottom 
line. See Lu, supra note 137, at 613. Commentators have stated that when a company is 
found to use child labor to produce its garments, it “ranks somewhere up there with toxic 
dumping or unsafe products in the list of evils that can blacken the image of a successful 
corporation.” Id. 
269 See supra notes 86–97, 126–30, 135–49 and accompanying text. 
270 See Kasky, 45 P.3d at 262; supra notes 126–30 and accompanying text. 
271 See Kasky, 45 P.3d at 262; supra notes 126–30 and accompanying text. 
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where labor abuses abroad are evidence of false advertising.272 This 
avoids the complicated and delicate issues involved in applying a law 
extraterritorially.273 Therefore, courts dealing with Kasky-style lawsuits 
may be more willing to hold corporations accountable.274
 A Kasky-style lawsuit might also provide a vital follow-up to boycotts 
and codes of conduct.275 Private codes of conduct, such as that en-
forced by the FLA, have no mechanism to punish companies that vio-
late the codes, or even to make most of the circumstances public.276 A 
Kasky-style lawsuit could argue that the words of the codes of conduct 
that companies place on their websites are a representation of fact 
about the product, and then sue for false advertising if there are viola-
tions of the code.277 This would provide a much needed ªnancial in-
centive for companies to comply with codes of conduct, which might 
lead to companies substantially improving sweatshop conditions to 
avoid lawsuits.278 Similarly, if anti-sweatshop advocates are boycotting a 
company for its sweatshop practices abroad, and the company denies 
the allegations, the activists could sue with a Kasky-style lawsuit.279 Fur-
ther precedent-building would be necessary before activists could sue 
based solely on codes of conduct.280
 Nonetheless, the problem of standing is a signiªcant barrier to using 
Kasky as a model to enforce such codes.281 Kasky brought suit under the 
California false advertising and unfair competition laws, which at the 
time allowed him to sue as a “private attorney general” without a per-
                                                                                                                      
272 See Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 262 (2002); supra notes 126–30 and accompany-
ing text. 
273 See Kasky, 45 P.3d at 262; supra notes 126–30 and accompanying text. 
274 See Kasky, 45 P.3d at 262; supra notes 126–30 and accompanying text. 
275 See Kasky, 45 P.3d at 262; supra notes 135–49 and accompanying text. 
276 See supra notes 144–52 and accompanying text. Again, the FLA does publish infor-
mation about the violations found in the factories it monitors, but not the name or loca-
tion of the speciªc factory. See Fair Labor Association, supra note 70. This makes the in-
formation impossible to check or verify. See id. 
277 Lu, supra note 137, at 619–21. 
278 See id. at 628. 
279 See id. 
280 See Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 247–48 (2002). Kasky certainly might lead to 
such a holding, but did not hold a code conduct to be commercial speech. See id. at 247–
48, 262. As discussed below, the wording of codes of conduct make it unclear whether they 
are statements of fact or promises, so activists may have difªculty using codes of conduct. 
See infra note 310 and accompanying text. 
281 See Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17203, 17204, 17206 (West 2005). 
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sonal injury.282 Most states, however, require some showing of injury or 
damages for an individual to sue based on the false advertising or un-
fair competition laws.283 Following Kasky, the voters of California passed 
an initiative changing the standing requirements for the state’s unfair 
competition and false advertising laws to require that a plaintiff have an 
injury in fact and have lost money or property.284 This new standing 
requirement will make it more difªcult for anti-sweatshop advocates to 
ªle suit in California, the only state where Kasky is precedent.285 None-
theless, in states requiring injury, many have found that nominal dam-
ages are sufªcient to create an injury.286 Many states also allow for non-
economic injuries such as emotional distress to establish an injury.287 
Thus, it is possible that advocates could make out an injury if they ªnd 
a plaintiff who had purchased the corporation’s product, and later 
there were media reports that the corporation did have sweatshops.288 
                                                                                                                      
282 See Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17204 (West 2004), amended by Cal. Bus. & Prof. 
Code § 17204 (West 2005) (stating that one “acting in the interests of itself, the members 
of the general public” could bring suit). 
283 See Bob Cohen, Annotation, Private Right Under State Consumer Protection Act—
Preconditions to Action, 117 A.L.R.5th 155 (2004–2005). Alabama, Arizona, and now California, 
Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Louisiana, Kansas, 
Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Caro-
lina, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, Washington, and West Virginia all require such an 
injury or actual damages. Id. at 197–205, 208–12. Despite Justice Breyer’s belief in Kasky’s 
dissent that California’s private attorney general statute was unique in its lack of injury, Ver-
mont has a similar code. See Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 9, § 2453(a) (2004); Cohen, supra at 205–06. 
Moreover, case law in Ohio has interpreted Ohio’s Unfair Competition Law to require no 
injury as well. Clayton v. McCary, 426 F. Supp. 248, 262 (N.D. Ohio 1976); Cohen, supra at 
205. 
284 See Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17204. This ballot, number 64, was approved by voters 
November 2, 2004, and went into effect the next day. Cal. Proposition 64, 2004 Cal. Leg-
isl. Serv. (West), available at http://vote2004.ss.ca.gov/voterguide/propositions/prop64 
text.pdf. The proposition is framed as a way to curb frivolous lawsuits initiated by lawyers 
whose “clients who have not used the defendant’s product or service, viewed the defen-
dant’s advertising, or had any other business dealing with the defendant . . . without any 
accountability to the public and without adequate court supervision.” Id. 
285 See Cal. Proposition 64, supra note 284. 
286 See Cohen, supra note 283, at 207. Minnesota, Washington and Hawaii all explicitly 
allow nominal damages to create injury. See id. For example, in Wexler v. Brothers Entm’t 
Group, the Court of Appeals of Minnesota found standing based on a wrongful $11.89 
telephone charge. 457 N.W.2d 218, 222 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990). Only Florida requires a 
“non-nominal” injury. Cohen, supra note 283, at 206–07. Since California’s new law only 
took effect in November 2004, no case law has developed as to whether nominal damages 
would be accepted. 
287 See Cohen, supra note 283, at 212–15. Louisiana, Massachusetts, and Texas have 
recognized a non-economic injury to be standing in such cases. Id. 
288 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 24, 26, Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654, 655, 667 
(2003) (No. 02-575). During oral arguments of Kasky, Solicitor General Olson admitted 
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But this would be breaking new ground and require setting precedent, 
which may make it difªcult for advocates, at least initially, to use Kasky 
in most states.289
 The limited remedies available under false advertising and unfair 
competition statutes present another barrier to using Kasky to improve 
sweatshop conditions.290 In California, for example, the remedies for 
an unfair business practice are an injunction to stop that practice,291 
compensation for the injury created by the unfair business practice,292 
and discretionary civil penalties.293 The unfair business practice in 
Kasky was Nike’s false and misleading statements.294 Thus, a Kasky-style 
lawsuit could result in an injunction to stop the misleading speech 
about sweatshop conditions, but not to stop the actual sweatshop prac-
tices themselves.295 It is possible, however, that damages from a Kasky-
style lawsuit could be so punitive as to persuade the defendant com-
pany to improve sweatshop conditions to avoid future lawsuits.296 The 
difªculty is that there is no court order and no guarantee that compa-
nies who are punished with a costly lawsuit will upgrade working condi-
tions, rather than take the less costly alternative of stiºing their 
speech.297
                                                                                                                      
that if someone had bought Nike shoes relying on an advertisement claiming good labor 
conditions, it would be sufªcient to create injury in the federal system. Id. at 24. Olson 
later compared this sort of injury with a stockholder injury under federal securities law, 
where injury is created by buying stock after reading misleading information in the proxy 
statement. Id. at 28. Another element that might be necessary for injury in certain states is 
reliance—that the consumer relied on this unfair business practice or false advertising to 
their detriment (i.e. by purchasing the product). See Cohen, supra note 283, at 222–26. In 
such cases, the advocate would have to ªrst hear the company proclaim its progress on 
sweatshop issues, buy the product based on this proclamation, and then hear news reports 
that the company’s proclamation was false. See id. 
289 Cohen, supra note 283, at 197–205, 208–212. Perhaps the easiest way to remedy the 
standing problem is to advocate for attorneys general of the states and the Federal Trade 
Commission to bring such suits instead of private individuals. See Lu, supra note 137, at 
617–18. The government needs to prove no injury to bring suit. See id. 
290 See, e.g., Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17203, 17206 (West 2005). 
291 Id. § 17203. 
292 Id. Essentially this is to compensate for the injury, although in Kasky there were 
none. Parloff, supra note 1, at 108. 
293 Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17206. 
294 See Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 262 (Cal. 2002). 
295 See id. 
296 See Mokhiber, supra note 18. It is hard to measure how punitive such damages could 
be, if an individual’s injury is buying a shoe. On the other hand, Kasky received a settle-
ment of a 1.5 million dollars, showing that ªnancially the stakes can be high. Id. 
297 See Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17203, 17206. 
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B. The Potential Chilling Effect of Kasky-style Lawsuits 
 Kasky’s chilling effect on corporate speech has in practice been quite 
limited, although many warned to the contrary.298 Indeed, the dissent-
ers in the California and U.S. Supreme Court believed the chilling ef-
fect of Kasky would be severe.299 Many in the business community called 
the decision “devastating,” warning that businesses would now refrain 
from discussing important public issues such as cloning and FDA drug 
approval.300 Nike announced in the wake of Kasky that it would with-
hold its annual Corporate Responsibility Report and would refrain 
from discussing social issues either with the media or at public 
events.301 Rhetoric aside, however, many companies are still speaking 
about social issues, albeit phrasing these statements carefully to include 
fewer factual statements.302 This suggests Kasky’s impact was less than 
expected, either because of corporations’ proªt motive or because of 
Kasky’s uncertain holding.303 Therefore, the use of Kasky-style lawsuits 
may not chill corporate speech, at least if they are used in modera-
tion.304
 Many companies, including Nike, still do discuss corporate respon-
sibility.305 Of the eight companies that were involved in the Apparel 
Industry Partnership, ªve still have codes of conduct for labor condi-
tions in factories posted on their website.306 While these codes are not 
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factual statements, they do represent a promise to consumers that fac-
tories will be conducted in a certain way.307 If all or most of a corpora-
tion’s factories do not meet the standard as represented in the code 
of conduct, this code might be misleading speech that could fall un-
der unfair competition or false advertising laws.308 Of the ªve compa-
nies that do have codes of conduct, only one, Reebok, makes factual 
claims about improvement of labor conditions.309 If false, these fac-
tual claims could be grounds for a false advertising suit under 
Kasky.310 Most companies are avoiding factual claims such as those 
that led to the suit against Nike.311 Nonetheless, companies have not 
withdrawn from discussing social issues altogether, and by posting 
these codes of conduct may be exposing themselves to a lawsuit.312 
The reason why companies act this way, despite the risk, is important 
in analyzing whether Kasky-style lawsuits will chill corporate speech.313
 Companies may be continuing to speak about social issues because 
of their proªt motive.314 The Supreme Court has explained that com-
mercial speech has a “greater hardiness” than noncommercial speech 
because companies speak for the purpose of increasing their proªt by 
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selling goods and services.315 Even if commercial speech is regulated, 
corporations will continue to speak because their existence is based on 
how much of the product or service they can sell.316 Thus, it is possible 
that companies are continuing to post codes of conduct on their web-
sites because they believe that despite the liability, speaking on such 
issues is vital to selling products.317 The anti-sweatshop movement has 
made it clear to companies that consumers do care about the labor 
conditions in which their garments are made.318 Companies may have 
done a cost-beneªt analysis, ªnding that it is advantageous to have a 
reputation of social responsibility, even if it opens up the potential of 
lawsuits.319
 Moreover, a close reading of the holding of the California Su-
preme Court allows companies to continue offering their opinions on 
social issues, but not false factual statements.320 The California Su-
preme Court held that the opinions about globalization and workers 
rights within Nike’s statements were fully protected by the First Amend-
ment.321 Only the “description[s] of actual conditions and practices” of 
the factories that manufactured Nike’s products were held to be false 
commercial speech.322 Thus, Kasky holds that commercial speech ex-
tends only to a company’s factual statements, not a company’s opinion 
about social responsibility.323 Kasky might be expanded in the future to 
include codes of conduct as commercial speech because promises fall 
within gray area between opinions and factual statements.324 Currently, 
however, companies can only be held liable for false factual claims.325 
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Following Kasky, companies make few express claims that could be 
veriªed easily, but seem to have realized that their liability for opinions 
and promises is limited at this time.326 Thus, it seems likely that com-
panies will continue to speak about social issues, but will be careful not 
to make false factual statements.327
 Since companies continue to speak about social issues because of 
the limited holding of Kasky and the proªt motive, advocates must use 
Kasky-style lawsuits in moderation.328 If advocates ºood corporations 
with Kasky-style lawsuits, the economic calculus will change for these 
corporations, and they will stop speaking about social issues.329 Anti-
sweatshop activists might want to expand Kasky’s holding to include 
codes of conduct as commercial speech, but again, if they push this too 
far, companies will stop releasing codes of conduct.330 To try to coun-
teract the ªnancial pressures of such lawsuits, activists need to maintain 
consumer pressure on corporations about sweatshop issues, so that 
companies will know it is in their best interest to keep speaking about 
labor.331 Moreover, consumer pressure accompanying such lawsuits 
could convince corporations to actually improve sweatshop condi-
tions.332 Thus, anti-sweatshop activists must use Kasky-style lawsuits in 
moderation, and in conjunction with consumer pressure, to avoid chill-
ing corporate speech.333
Conclusion 
 Kasky has created a new but ºawed tool for anti-sweatshop activists 
to use to hold corporations accountable for their sweatshop condi-
tions.334 In a time when public enforcement is ineffective in improving 
sweatshop conditions both at home and abroad, advocates have 
searched for an effective private enforcement device.335 In some ways, 
Kasky can provide such a device, because it expands commercial speech 
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for the purpose of false advertising laws.336 Nonetheless, signiªcant bar-
riers remain to using Kasky effectively.337 The need for an injury to ªle 
suit will make Kasky difªcult to utilize.338 Moreover, the limited reme-
dies inherent in false advertising statutes suggest that Kasky in itself will 
not lead to corporations improving sweatshop conditions.339 There is 
also the danger that the Supreme Court will at some point overturn the 
reasoning behind Kasky, as they expressed disapproval of the California 
Supreme Court’s opinion.340 The chilling effect of Kasky, however, was 
less than expected, suggesting the Kasky-style lawsuits used in modera-
tion might not chill corporate speech on social issues.341 In conjunction 
with consumer pressure, a Kasky-style lawsuit could lead corporations to 
improve sweatshop conditions.342 In sum, Kasky is an imperfect instru-
ment, but one anti-sweatshop activists should explore and expand.343
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